Integrated missions: the challenge of planning and command by Eriksen, Bjørnar
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Norwegian Defence Staff College 
Spring 2007 
 
 
Master Thesis 
 
Integrated Missions 
The Challenge of Planning and Command 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      By 
 
Bjørnar Eriksen 
Major 
 
 
 
Thesis advisor: 
Mats Berdal 
Prof 
Kings College London 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Abstract 
 
Civil-Military Integration is a growing trend in modern peace operations. Most leading nations 
and international organisations are developing integrated structures at strategic levels and have 
started to change their doctrines to include a broader spectrum of tools disposable to the 
national as well as the international community. The UN has established and is implementing 
their concept of Integrated Missions which aims to link the long term development and short 
term peacekeeping effort into their peace-building strategy.  
This thesis is analysing this concept, focusing on the planning and structuring of 
Integrated Missions and exploring what consequences it will have to the military component. 
First the thesis reviews some of the important historical developments toward civil-military 
integration and multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping during the 1990s. The Military Force 
Commander became a military adviser to a political leader, and the UN operations became 
more civil in form and function and the military’s task portfolio widened to include an 
increasingly number of non-military tasks. Further the thesis is establishing a theoretical 
model of an integrated mission in a wider peace building context involving the humanitarian 
sector, the UN country team and the non-governmental organisations. Planning and structure 
of a mission is focused. This model is then brought to the practical level by doing a single case 
study of the ongoing UN Mission in Sudan, focusing on the planning, the establishment and 
structure as mandated in Security Resolution 1590. This mission seems to be well integrated 
already from the beginning involving the UN Country Team in the strategy and planning. The 
mission has a unified plan coordinated with the humanitarian work plan for Sudan. 
The concept of Integrated Mission implies that the military component must share their 
planning, information, staff and logistics with the civilian sector in the operations. The UN is 
focusing on implementation of the concept in their future missions, establishing more 
integrated structures at mission HQ level and more integrated processes at all levels. The 
military must provide more expertise in form of intelligence and joint level staff experiences 
in order to establish the new integrated structures. Further the humanitarian sector of the UN 
(OCHA) and the peacekeeping sector (DPKO) seem to focus on coordination of their policy 
documents and de-confliction of roles especially when it comes to the military involvement in 
humanitarian efforts. Integration is much about understanding roles; avoiding duplication of 
effort and trying to bring synergies in a comprehensive strategy.  
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1 Introduction 
Civil-Military integration has become the dominating trend in the international community’s 
response to conflict and crisis. Seminars, articles and discussions are now marked by the new 
buzzwords; “Integrated Approach”, “Comprehensive Approach”, “System Wide Thinking”, 
“The Whole of Government Approach” etc.1 The military forces are increasingly involved in 
non-military tasks, supporting humanitarian actors, doing reconstruction work, supporting 
local elections and so on. Joint civil-military operations are ongoing in Afghanistan and Iraq 
with so-called Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT).2 The trend indicates that civil-
military integration not only is a strategic initiative but also part of the development on the 
ground. The blurring of the civilian and military sphere is in other words moving to a new 
dimension and the field of civil-military relations will probably be even more important in 
future operations. These ideas and trends are a logic consequence of the complex environment 
facing all actors involved in post conflict peace-building operations. 
 Today the international community, including the United Nations (UN) is involved in 
a record high number of peace operations of which most involves peace-building or nation 
building efforts.3 The UN is involved in 15 different peacekeeping missions covering the 
whole spectrum of operations, from traditional monitoring missions via complex multi-
dimensional peacekeeping to running de facto a UN protectorate in Kosovo.4 Most missions 
and their mandates combine the political, security, humanitarian, development, and human 
rights dimensions in the post conflict phase. The UN is also increasingly working together 
with regional organisations like North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), European Union 
(EU) and the African Union (AU) in so-called “hybrid operations” in which the UN provide 
one component.5  
The UN response to the increasingly complex environment is the concept of Integrated 
Missions which aims to achieve better coherence and unity of effort between the development 
and peace-building actors, the humanitarian actors and the UN peacekeeping missions. 
                                                 
1
 Stuart Gordon. “The Changing role of the military in assistance strategies” Research Report 21: Resetting the 
rules of engagement: Trends and issues in military-humanitarian relations (London: Humanitarian Policy 
Group, 2006), pp. 39-51. 
2
 For a good description on the development of PRTs, see Robert M. Perito, “The US experience with Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified”, Special Report, (Washington: United States Institute 
of Peace, 2005), available at: www.usip.org. 
3
 Ian Johnstone (ed), Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007: A project of the Centre on International 
Cooperation (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, 2007). 
4
 United Nations, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Background Note 31 March 2007” (New York: 
United Nations Department of Public Information, 2007): http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm 
5
 Bruce Jones, with Feydal Cherif  “Evolving Models of Peacekeeping Policy Implications & Responses”, 
External Study (2003), available at: pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/library 
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Integration is stated to be the guiding principle for the design and implementation of complex 
UN operations in post-conflict situations and for linking the different dimensions of peace-
building (political, development, humanitarian, human rights, and rule of law and security 
aspects) into a coherent support strategy.”6 
The only in depth study on the subject, the Report on Integrated Missions published in 
2005 concludes that the success of the implementation is mixed.7 There seems to be lack of 
understanding of the system, each others roles, culture and lack of common doctrines and 
procedures. Most of the criticism has come from the humanitarian community which seems to 
have the biggest resistance towards the concept. The main problem for the humanitarian actors 
seems to be their fear of being part of the political agenda and thereby part of the conflict, with 
the consequence of becoming targeted by spoilers (some examples have aroused from 
Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan).8 Protection of the so-called “humanitarian 
space” where they can uphold their principles of impartiality, neutrality, and humanity is 
highlighted in their criticism. The report highlights that the problems of integration are centred 
on structure and processes. There is no culture for integrated processes and the stow-piped 
structure within the UN system as well as within the missions hampers the integration 
processes. The report suggests improvement along three broad lines: Mission planning, 
mission design and leadership and management.9 From the military point of view there seems 
to be no critical discussion towards integration, despite the fact that it might affect the military 
component in several areas.  
Since the military still is the dominant component in most of the UN peacekeeping 
missions and that the whole mission largely depends on military assets it seems obvious that 
more integrated structures and processes will affect the military. Civil-military interaction in 
the planning, in the structures and ultimately on the ground will probably increase. The 
question is how, and to what extent? Assuming that integration is something more than just 
coordination it seems logical that civilian actors will be more involved in military planning at 
different levels, and vice versa. Will there be a need for a civil-military integrated 
headquarters at the field level in order to succeed with this concept and if so, what challenges 
will that bring to the table? Integrated planning processes must be developed, sharing of 
information and intelligence, interoperability in procedures and systems may be needed. 
                                                 
6
 Kofi Annan, “Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions” (New York, The Secretary General, 2006), p.1 
7
 Espen Barth Eide, Anja Therese Kaspersen, Randolph Kent, Karen von Hippel, “Report on Integrated Missions: 
Practical Perspectives and Recommendations”, External Study (2005). 
8
 Erin A Weir, “Conflict and Compromise: UN Integrated Missions and the Humanitarian Imperative”, KAIPTC 
Monograph (Accra, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, 2006). 
9
 Eide, et al, 2005, pp 38-43. 
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Improved communication, coordination, and cooperation across components at all levels are 
probably needed, and thereby the CIMIC (civil military coordination)10 functions must be 
strengthened. How will the command and control issues be solved, not unimportant to the 
military component given earlier troubled experiences from Somalia and Bosnia?11   
Problem 
Based on the above-described trends and development towards an Integrated Missions 
approach and possible challenges my research question will be:  
How will an Integrated Mission affect the military role and function in a peacekeeping 
mission? 
In order to answer this question I will focus the research to the following three issues: 
1) What is the reason behind integration and who is to be integrated from the complex of 
actors involved in peace-building in a post conflict environment? 
2) How is the UN planning their Integrated Missions and how is the integrated approach 
reflected in mandates, plans and concept of operations (CONOPS)?  
3) How the structure of an Integrated Mission organised and what is the military role and 
function in an Integrated Concept?  
 
The scope and argument for the study 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the concept of Integrated Mission, how it is planned 
and organised and ultimately how the increased civil-military integration will affect the 
military component when it comes to planning and command of missions. The thesis will give 
an overview of the concept, the status and how the UN is approaching the concept in their 
missions in the field. The main reason for studying the UN explicit is the fact that UN 
peacekeeping missions in many ways has had a civil-military structure in their operations 
since the early 1990s and thereby it should be possible to find experiences and lessons from 
earlier operations. The UN is also the only organisation able, at least in theory, to bring all 
actors together in a truly integrated approach. The latest developments and the growing 
importance of UN operations, especially to the Norwegian Government is also an argument 
for this study.  
                                                 
10
 The term CIMIC is a contested concept with many different definitions. UN is using coordination while NATO 
uses civil-military cooperation, the US is using CMO (civil military operations), and the UN and humanitarian 
community are using civil-military coordination (CMCoord).  
11
 David Alberts, Richard E. Hayes, Command arrangements for Peace Operations (Washington: National 
Defence University, 1995). 
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Definition of key terms 
This paragraph will clarify some key concepts important in order to understand the overall 
context of the integrated approach and the UN terminology. The UN is categorising their 
response to conflicts as follows:12  
• Preventive Diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from developing between parties, 
to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflict and to limit the expansion of 
conflicts when they occur. 
 
• Peace-making is diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement 
through such peaceful means as those foreseen under Chapter VI of the United Nations 
Charter. 
 
• Peacekeeping is a United Nation presence in the field (normally involving military 
and civilian personnel), with the consent of the conflicting parties, to implement or 
monitor the implementation of agreements relating to the control of conflicts (cease 
fires, separation of forces, etc) and their lotion (partial or comprehensive settlements) 
or to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian relief. 
 
• Peace-enforcement may be needed when all other efforts fail. The authority for 
enforcement is provided by Chapter VII of the Charter, and includes the use of armed 
force to maintain or restore international peace and security situations in which the 
Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace or act of aggression. 
 
• Peace-building is critical in the aftermath of conflict…it includes the identification 
and support of measures and structures which will promote peace and build trust and 
interaction among former enemies, in order to avoid relapse into conflict. 
 
Peacekeeping  
The classic distinction between the peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building effort is 
not that clear anymore and today the different categories intermingles. Peacekeeping is as 
described above, a UN presence in the field with some kind of observers or formed units, 
police or military, normally aiming to stabilise a situation after an agreement to end the 
conflict has been reached. Peacekeeping is not intended to be a long term project although 
some missions last for decades. Peace-building missions are normally political missions 
focusing on political long term assistance to the country involved, and do not involve formed 
military or police units. The challenge today is that peacekeeping missions has become more 
complicated, and has increasingly entered the peace-building sphere. The Brahimi Report 
stated that peace-building had become an integral part of all peacekeeping operations.13 The 
                                                 
12
 United Nations, General Guidelines for Peace-keeping Operations (New York: DPKO, 1995), pp. 5-6. 
13
 United Nations, A/55/305 - S/2000/809, “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” (New 
York: UN, 2000), para 35. 
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UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) sees peacekeeping as a distinction to 
peace-building, but acknowledges that multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions are 
complementing the peace-building effort. In the “UN Guidelines on Integrated Missions 
Planning Process“(IMPP) it is stated: “…the United Nations sometimes mounts multi-
disciplinary peace support operations of which a peacekeeping mission is a component”.14 In 
other words the peacekeeping missions have become a part of the peace-building effort, but 
still distinct from a peace-building mission which is political, normally led by the UN 
Department of Political Affairs (DPA).15 
The UN categorises the peacekeeping operations in three broad categories: Traditional 
Peacekeeping, Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping and Transitional Administration.16 
Traditional peacekeeping features response to inter-state conflicts, typically an observer/ 
verifying mission or a buffer between parties with military force (UN Interim Force in 
Lebanon is one example). Multi-dimensional peacekeeping features respond to intra-state 
conflicts, proactive support to parties, involving civilian and military capabilities and a wide 
area of tasks, including those normally in the category of peace-building (UN missions in 
Liberia, Côte l voire, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo and Haiti are examples). 
Transitional administration involves UN temporary authority over the civil functions and 
administration in a given country or province of a country. This includes authority over the 
legislative, executive and judicial structures (UN Mission in Kosovo and Timor Leste are two 
examples). Transitional administration is highly complex, and implies involvement from the 
broad spectrum of those capacities normally needed to run a country (Economic, Health, 
Police, Military, Customs, Political, and Energy etc).   
Methodology  
To answer the problem and questions raised in this thesis I will rely on a qualitative 
exploratory research design combining what can be called status and case study approaches. 
Status research implies a representative or selected sample of one or more phenomena is 
examined to determine its special characteristics.17 In this thesis the characteristics of the UN 
Integrated Missions will be the phenomena to examine. The aim is to understand the 
background, the development and ultimately to provide a theoretical framework for the 
discussion. This will be an ideal model which can be analyzed and discussed towards a case 
                                                 
14
 DPKO, “Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP): Guidelines endorsed by the Secretary-General (2006). 
15
 United Nations, Department of Political Affairs web page: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/fieldmissions.html 
16
 Challenges of Peace Operations Project, “Capstone Doctrine for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations-draft 
2-07/08/06” (2006), pp. 10-14. Available at: http://www.challengesproject.net 
17
 Chris Hart, Doing Your Masters Dissertation (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2005). 
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representing the reality in operations. The Case study will explore how the concept of 
Integrated Mission is approached in reality and bring differences and challenges to the table 
for discussion and analysis. 
Data collection will rely on secondary and primary techniques. Secondary means 
reviewing literature, documents and data collected for other purpose than the study at hand.18 
This technique is relevant in order to establish an understanding of the peacekeeping context, 
the status of the Integrated Mission concept and the theoretical framework. Primary techniques 
imply data collection from sources related to the topic and the problem.19 The primary 
collection will rely on informal conversations and briefings from a sample of personnel 
serving in UN headquarters in New York and conversations with officers and civilians who 
have served in different UN missions lately. For the case study I will use official documents, 
some semi structured interviews and conversations with a sample of officers in central 
positions able to provide a broader picture and understanding.  
Case selection is a challenge since the UN is involved in a wide range of different 
missions, and according to the literature no mission is alike. For this research I will rely on a 
case, which at least involves the complexity of actors and a military component, and 
preferably is defined as an Integrated Mission. In other words a multi-dimensional 
peacekeeping operation will be the case to choose. The term “integrated” has so far only 
occurred as part of the mission name in the current police operation in Timor Leste (UN 
Integrated Mission in Timor Leste) and in the two latest established political missions 
established in 2005 and 2006 (UN integrated office in Sierra Leone and Burundi).20  
According to the Report on Integrated Missions all missions should in principle be integrated, 
at least those started recreantly. The multi-dimensional missions described in literature as 
integrated, is the former mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the ongoing mission in Liberia 
(UNMIL), the mission in Congo (MONUC), and also the mission in Sudan (UNMIS). 21  
My selection will be to look closer into UNMIS for three main reasons. Firstly it is the 
latest multi-dimensional mission established (2005); secondly it involves the complexity of 
actors needed to point out the challenges I’m looking for in my thesis; thirdly it gives me 
access to sources and documentation, which is quite good since Norwegian officers have 
                                                 
18
 Hart, 2005, pp. 354-362. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 United Nations, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Background Note 31 March 2007”: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote. 
21
 Eide, et al, 2005. 
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served or are serving in central staff positions within the mission.  I have also access to 
officers who were involved in the planning for the start up of the mission and thereby could 
provide some reliable information on the integration challenges in that aspect.  Even though I 
study UNMIS especially, I will also use some lessons identified from other missions in the 
discussion. The literature will provide a range of lessons learned and identified from several 
missions, and briefings from strategic level will involve lessons from the broader picture.  
Sources, literature and research status 
This paragraph will give an overview of the sources I have relied on in this study, and also an 
overview of the past research within the field of Integrated Missions. Finding and selection of 
the most relevant literature for research on this topic has been a challenge. There is an 
overwhelming amount of literature within the field of peacekeeping, but hardly any covering 
Integrated Missions explicit. Writings on Integrated Missions are limited to the already 
mentioned independent study Report on Integrated Missions published in 2005, some 
conference reports on the subject, 22 and several critical articles from the humanitarian 
community. Two examples which give a good overview are: “Resetting the rules of 
engagement, trends and issues in military-humanitarian relations,” published by Humanitarian 
Policy Group in 200623, and “Conflict and Compromise: UN Integrated Missions and the 
humanitarian Imperative”, a monograph published by the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Centre in 
2006.24 Another example is the study report “Challenges to humanitarian Space”25 from the 
Monitoring and Steering Group in Liberia, which is a more in depth study on civil-military 
interaction in the field. Generally the writing from the humanitarian side is dealing with the 
problems of civil-military integration in the field, and the problem of military interference into 
their spheres.  
The Report on Integrated Missions will provide a basis for my study, since it is the 
only in depth past research of the topic, and the core document the UN seems to rely on when 
it comes to implementing the concept. The report is the result of an independent study of how 
well the integration ambition was implemented in 6 different UN missions. The study group 
conducted field visits to the missions and conducted over 700 interviews and thereby I will 
consider the report to be quite reliable. This report was followed by a conference on the topic 
                                                 
22
 Kari Osland (ed), The UN & Integrated Missions” Conference Proceedings (2005). 
23
 Victoria Wheeler and Adele Harmer, ”Resetting the rules of engagement: Trends and issues in military-
humanitarian relations” (2006), available at: www.odihpn.org 
24
 Weir, 2006. 
25
 Sida Lewis, “Challenges to Humanitarian Space” (Liberia, Monitoring Steering Group, 2005). 
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in Oslo in 2005 which aimed to discuss the recommendations from the previous report.26 The 
conclusion from this conference was broadly speaking the same as the previous report. All 
agreed that integration was the way to make the UN more effective, and there was consensus 
on implementing inclusive planning processes. Further it was stated that many UN missions 
now are focusing on integration, but that the degree varies. It was also stated that not 
everything should be integrated, and that the situation in the field should decide how, and in 
what degree the mission should integrate. Higher level of violence implied less integration and 
need for independency from the humanitarian sector. Asymmetric integration was suggested, 
deeper integration in development sector, lighter in humanitarian. When it comes to ongoing 
research, the Norwegian Government has initiated a project on Integrated Missions as a 
follow-up of the conference held in Oslo.27 This project is in the form of a series of 
workshops, coordinated with the UN`s doctrine development project. This is an ongoing 
project which aims to concretise how the UN should be able to implement the integration 
ambitions in the future.  
In order to get a better overview of the topic and of the development of UN 
peacekeeping, it has been necessary to look into the literature from a different angle. Firstly I 
have tried to get an overview of the UN development in different operations throughout the 
1990s by studying some of the latest published literature and secondly concentrated on 
literature covering civil-military relations more explicit. Besides from published books found 
at the library most of the relevant sources are available at the Internet. I have downloaded 
many reports and documents from official web pages from different institutions. Of course 
there is a danger that the sources not are credible on the web, but I have only used official web 
pages from normally credible institutions. UN`s web page “UN.org” is a good address to get 
access to resolutions, documents and lessons learned studies. The page also has good links to 
other important sources like OCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) 
and UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The “Centre on International 
Cooperation” located at New York City University has also been used in order to get access to 
lessons learned reports and reviews of past peace operations. This is a research institution 
funded by 36 different institutions including the government of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, 
UK, Netherlands, Japan, Ireland and Canada, doing research on peace operations. The Centre 
has published four literature reviews on peacekeeping managed by Ian Johnstone. The latest of 
these:” Recent Thinking on Peacekeeping: Comprehensive Literature Review No. 4" covers 
                                                 
26
 Kari Osland (ed),”The UN & Integrated Missions, Conference Proceedings” (Oslo, NUPI, 2005). 
27
 See Norway Mission to the UN:  http://www.norway-un.org/News/missions+project.htm 
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the most relevant writing within the field of peacekeeping and were quite helpful to get the 
first overview.28 The literature is dominated by case studies, especially inductive studies that 
draw lessons from practice. The studies of UN record; their problems and failures during the 
1990s still dominate the literature. However there are several works published recently that 
seems to balance the negative view with more positive studies.29 
The UN development of the 1990s is covered in a multitude of literature and studies. I 
have chosen to rely on the recently published United Nations Interventionism 1991-2004, 
which is a sample of eight case studies of major UN interventions starting with Cambodia in 
1992, ending with Sierra Leone in 2000-01. Further I have focused on two important works 
covering civil-military relations in peacekeeping during the same period. Thomas G Weiss 
book Military-Civilian Interactions: Humanitarian Crises and the Responsibility to Protect 
and Michael C Williams`Civil-military relations and peacekeeping. Weiss is discussing the 
growth of the humanitarian agenda during the 1990s,30 while Williams is studying the 
challenges of civil-military interactions during the surge of peacekeeping in the 1990s.31 I 
have also briefly looked into the two classical works The Soldier and the State by Samuel 
Huntington and The Professional Soldier by Morris Janowitz. For Huntington, the central skill 
of the soldier is the “management of violence,” the art of planning, organizing, and employing 
military force. He believed in the distinctiveness of the military mindset. He says that it is 
“pessimistic, collectivist, historically inclined, power-oriented, nationalistic, militaristic, 
pacifist and instrumentalist in its view on military profession. It is in brief realistic and 
conservative”.32 I will argue that Huntington’s theory probably is the one which is most rooted 
in the military culture, focusing on disconnection from the civilian society to uphold military 
professionalism. Janowitz on the contrary had the opposite view, seeking more integration 
between civilian and military spheres. Both theories written in the light of the US Army’s 
policing and reconstruction of Germany and Western Europe after WWII which in many ways 
can be compared to the multi-dimensional peacekeeping and peace-building efforts throughout 
                                                 
28
 Ian Johnstone, “Peace operations Literature Review” (2005), available at: http://www.cic.nyu.edu/ 
29
 See two interesting studies: Michael Doyle & Nicholas Sambanis, Quantitative study of 121 civil wars of 
which 27 had a UN intervention is interesting, especially for those who promote integration and holistic 
approaches. They found that the UN operations had an impact, and that the most successful operations were 
those addressing the wider spectrum of problems in a society and not only the military.  James Dobbins study, 
comparing US and UN-led operations, found that UN peace-building was more successful than the US, 
especially measured against the input (recourses, forces, and equipment). Much of the reasons were the UN`s 
ability to address the whole spectrum of the societies, from political to military problems. 
30
 Thomas G Weiss, Military-Civilian Interactions: Humanitarian Crises and the Responsibility to Protect, 2nd ed 
(Lanham:  Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2004). 
31
 Michael C. Williams, “Civil-military relations and peacekeeping”, Adelphi Papers, nr 321, 1998. 
32
 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), p. 68. 
 18 
the world today. The military’s traditional focus on being disconnected from the political and 
civilian matters might at least explain some of the reasons why civil-military integration can 
be problematic and challenging. 
The final category of sources I have used is official UN documentation, resolutions, reports, 
guidelines, policy documents from the humanitarian as well as from DPKO on civil-military 
interactions. The most important documents from UN regarding Integrated Missions is the 
mentioned “Brahimi Report”, the SG “Guidelines on Integrated Missions”, DPKO`s 
“Integrated Mission Planning Process” document, and their “Policy Directive on Joint 
Operations Centres (JOC) and Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMAC)”. When it comes to 
doctrines and guidelines I have relied on DPKO`s Handbook on United Nations 
Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations published in 2003 and also the drafted “Capstone 
Doctrine” which probably will be implemented as the core UN doctrine document. For the 
case study of UNMIS, I will mainly use official documentation from the peace process, the 
planning of the mission and progress reports from the SG to the Security Council. This will be 
broadened with some interviews and conversations with officers who have served or are 
serving in the mission. 
Structure of the thesis 
Following this introduction, chapter two will present the historical background and the 
development of the peacekeeping environment leading to the call for integration and answer 
the question of why integration has become the core issue in today’s peace operations. Focus 
will be on the two principal dimensions the integrated approach is trying to bring together; the 
Peacekeepers and the Humanitarian / development sector.  Chapter three will then explore and 
present a theoretical framework of the concept of Integrated Mission. This will be done 
through modelling a generic Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping Mission in an integrated 
context. Focus will be on planning, structure and the military components role and function. 
Chapter four will present the case of UNMIS and discuss differences and challenges compared 
to the theoretical framework.  Focus will be on the planning, mission structure, the processes 
and how this is affecting the military component. The final chapter will synthesize the findings 
and ultimately review the main implications the integrated concept might have on the military 
component.  
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2 New demands, new tasks, more actors, the origins of integration 
In the introduction I mentioned that the call for integration is a logic consequence of the 
increasingly complex environment the modern peacekeepers find themselves in. The concept 
of Integrated Mission is argued to be introduced by the Brahimi report in 2000, with the 
proposal to establish the “Integrated Task Force” at the strategic level in order to gain a more 
coherent strategic planning before launching new missions. Bruce Jones argues that it was 
developed for the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in 1999 with all components (EU, OSCE 
and UNHCR) reporting to the SRSG. Barth Eide states that the first formal call for integrated 
and unified approach within the UN came with the Secretary General (SG) report on 
Renewing the United Nations-a programme for Reform in 1997. SRSGs were given more 
authority and he instituted a system of Integrated Missions.33 However it can be argued that 
this only is the culmination of the development starting in the early 1990s, when the UN 
entered a new type of peacekeeping which demanded broader approaches and developed the 
civil-military structure within their missions.  In a visit at DPKO I was told that “integration is 
nothing new to the UN, we are just trying to do it better”.34 This chapter will look into the 
main reasons why integration has become the core issue of the UN`s approach to peace 
operations. UN peacekeeping missions changed in form and structure during the 1990s, many 
lessons were identified, and the humanitarian agenda led to an increasingly crowded area of 
operations.  This chapter will focus on these dimensions, and end with a description of the 
complex of civilian actors the military peacekeeper has to cope with in planning and execution 
of the operations in an integrated context.  
The humanitarian agenda and the new demand for peacekeeping during the 1990s 
The rise of the humanitarian agenda is one of the main arguments why integration has become 
necessary and important. The basis is the change of warfare during the 1990s which led to 
increased demands for peacekeepers, and more humanitarian effort, which again created an 
increased market for the non-governmental humanitarian sector. The end of the Cold War 
triggered the increase of intrastate warfare, with increased targeting of civilians and 
humanitarian suffering. According to a Human Development Report from UNDP (UN 
Development Program) in 1994, seventy-nine of eighty-two armed conflicts started since 1989 
were civil wars. “By the late of the 1990s virtually all of the twenty-five or so wars with more 
that one thousand annual deaths…were within states rather than between them.”35 These wars 
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took place within civilian societies, in urban areas, and the tactics used by parties included 
systematic targeting of civilians. The humanitarian suffering exploded and refugee problems 
rose within war torn countries as well as in the regions.  The UN intervened with peacekeepers 
in higher rate than ever. From 1956 to 1988 only 13 peacekeeping missions had been 
conducted, from 1988 to 1996, 29 new operations were established.36 The peacekeepers met a 
new environment with new demands. It can be argued that they had a steep curve of learning 
during the 1990s, struggling with old interpretation of their concepts, lacking recourses, 
possessed inadequate mandates, and generally faced a situation, in which they not were 
prepared to handle. The initial success with operations in Namibia (1989-90) and to some 
extent Cambodia (1992-93) was overshadowed of the failures in Somalia (1993), Bosnia 
(1992-95) and in Rwanda (1994).37 Despite many problems these missions contributed to the 
transformation of UN peacekeeping towards civil-military structures and a wider task portfolio 
for the military arm of the missions.  
The operations in Namibia in (UNTAG) and Cambodia (UNTAC) can be argued to be 
pioneer missions for the development of multi-dimensional peacekeeping. They involved 
larger civilian footprints within the missions, new task portfolio for the military components 
and were the first to be headed by a civilian political leader (SRSG). The central objective of 
these missions was to create conditions for the holding of free and fair elections. UNTAG 
consisted of a civilian component of 2 000 personnel, and a military component of 4 500 
troops. It deployed at almost 200 different locations throughout the country. The Force 
Commander was the military adviser to the SRSG and reported through him to the Secretary 
General. The military logistic element worked closely with the civilian element.38 Lakhdar 
Brahimi praises the then SRSG Martti Ahrisaari in his innovative approach in designing and 
implementation of this mission and argues that it was the start of the new generation of 
peacekeeping.39 This development continued with the operation in Cambodia which was a 
complex multi-dimensional operation combining a large civilian component with a Joint 
Military component consisting all military functions. UNTAC consisted of 15 547 mil troops, 
893 mil observers, 3 500 civilian police, 1 140 international civilian staff, 4 830 local civilian 
staff. The military component had an air support group with 10 fixed wing and 26 helicopters, 
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signal unit, logistic battalion and also a naval element. As stated by Berdal and Leifer: “It was 
the most ambitious and expensive undertaking in the peacekeeping experience of the 
organisation”.40 Berdal and Leifer higlight the problems of strategic planning (or lack of it), 
command and control problems and the logistical challenges and they argue that the lessons 
from Cambodia “not should be a model for future operations”.41 However despite these 
problems, the civil-military design of this operation would influence and strengthen the way 
the UN should design its future operations. The mission had a civilian-military structure at HQ 
and sector level in the provinces with a political leader (SRSG) as the highest authority. 
Further the military component was given a wide portfolio of tasks, from classical verification 
of withdrawal of troops to supporting disarmament and demobilisation programs, 
reconstruction tasks, provide security at reception centres for refugees, and even running the 
civil communication network. The UN civilian police also changed their tasks from being 
monitors and observers to become the actual executive police force with authority to arrest.42 
All these functions and innovations can be found in most of modern multi-dimensional 
peacekeeping the UN is conducting today.  
Simultaneously with the operation in Cambodia, the UN also intervened in Bosnia 
(UNPROFOR) and Somalia (UNOSOM) in 1992. Two operations that would intensify the 
humanitarian agenda of the 1990s, and further expand the UN`s spectrum of operations. These 
missions were initiated solely on humanitarian reasons in which the main objective was to 
protect the humanitarian personnel.43 Again new barriers were crossed for UN peacekeeping in 
which support to the humanitarian organisations became the core tasks. The need for 
coordination and cooperation between a growing numbers of actors were clearly demonstrated 
in these two missions. The operation in Somalia started with a small chapter VI based mission 
with 4500 troops to support delivery of humanitarian aid and changed to a US led chapter VII 
enforcement operation with 36000 troops (UNITAF). UNITAF involved a multinational UN 
and a large national component (US) which not accepted to be under UN command. The 
mission had no political component, and according to Weiss, “many observers argued that 
UNITAF spent its energy on treating the symptoms and not the actual disease”.44 Clearly it 
was an example on a mission based on “military solutions” not addressing the real problems 
and consequently led to problems for the peacekeepers. UNITAF was replaced in 1993 by the 
                                                 
40
 Mats Berdal and Michael Leifer, “Cambodia” in United Nations Interentionism 1991-2004. p. 32. 
41
 Berdal and Leifer, 2007, p. 63. 
42
 Berdal and Leifer, 2007, pp. 42-55. 
43
 Weiss, 2004, p. 72. 
44
 Weiss, 2004, p. 65. 
 22 
first chapter VII mission under UN command (UNOSOM II). The mission had a strong 
mandate but was not able to generate forces to fill the structure and thereby lacked the 
recourses to fulfil the mandated tasks. Command and control weaknesses, understaffing , 
different rules of engagements (ROE) between the contingents and ultimately the US decision 
to engage in war against one of the clan leaders led to mission failure and retreat in 1995.  
The UN operation in Former Yoguslavia (UNPROFOR) starting as an interim 
arrangement to establish and protect three demilitarized zones in Croatia in 1992 also proved 
to be more complex and more demanding than the UN planners had hoped for. The 
peacekeeping forces were deployed to support the UNHCR`s (UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees) humanitarian relief operation and evolved with the ongoing war into Bosnia in 92-
95. The UN continuously added new tasks and changed the structure without having any clear 
strategy besides supporting the UNHCR. The UN peacekeepers found themselves in the centre 
of an evolving civil war involving belligerents with no intention to neither end the fighting nor 
respect the UN interrupting their activity. The UN troops arrived into war zones with light 
forces, based on traditional peacekeeping mentality with the intent to escort humanitarian 
convoys and provide security at airfields and ports. The refugee problems increased with 
intensity and by late 1992, it was over two million displaced persons within Bosnia leading to 
high pressure on the UNHCR as well as the UNPROFOR forces. The World Food Program 
and UNICEF became operational in 1992, the World Health Organisation in 1993. By 1993 
UNHCR staff grows from 19 to over 700 deployed personnel in 29 different offices with a 
budget rising from $295mill to over $500mill.45 UNPROFOR faced serious problems to deal 
with the operational environment, and the main problem was that it was not structured, nor 
manned to establish security for the humanitarian effort in a war zone. However the need for a 
better coherent strategy, better cooperation with the different actors as well as the 
humanitarian sector was recognized and had been learned when the international community 
entered Kosovo five years later.  
Civil-military relationships, challenges and lessons from Cambodia to Bosnia 
The operations in Cambodia, Somalia and Bosnia brought hard lessons to the UN as well as 
other actors involved in peacekeeping. Closer cooperation between the civilian and military 
actors was needed both in the strategic planning as well as in the field at the tactical level. 
Michael Williams argues that framing of the mandates at strategic level is a civilian preserve 
and that it needs more adequate military advice and input. He also stresses the importance that 
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peacekeeping operations encompass overlapping political, military and humanitarian 
components. Field headquarters must establish and maintain close contact and cooperation 
with an increasingly number of other actors. The tensions between the military and civilian 
actors are the same as Huntington argued happened in the 1950s Europe. Huntington opinion 
was that they occur because of different culture, different agendas and lack of understanding 
of each other’s roles. Williams added that the officers and especially the senior officers` lack 
of experience of cooperation with civilians is another factor, which hampers the relationship. 
As earlier mentioned the military culture is marked by Huntington’s theory about professional 
traditions, keeping distance to the civil society and not involve civilians into military matters.46 
One important innovation within the military structures coming from this reality is the 
development of the Civil-Military Coordination and Cooperation structures (CIMIC) designed 
to improve the relationship and coordination between the civilian actors and the military. The 
function of CIMIC is a consequence of the need for coordination on the ground, starting in 
Somalia with US establishment of so-called Civil Military Coordination Centres (CMOC)47 
and continued with establishment of CIMIC functions within military staffs in UNPROFOR 
and the later NATO operations.  
Command and Control has been a continuous issue of debate and discussion in UN 
operations since the lessons of the early 1990s. Especially Western Nations seem to have 
become “allergic” to UN command. This is recently exemplified when European countries 
returned to the UN operation in Lebanon demanding establishment of a UNIFIL strategic cell 
beside the DPKO in New York, reporting directly to the SG.48 There is common agreement 
that unity of command is essential in operations, however there are few nations, if any at all, 
that accept a full multi national command of their forces. Dual commands, national 
interference, bypassing of lines has been more normal than the exception in UN as well as 
other multinational operations. Williams argue that the UN`s approach with a civilian political 
leader; (SRSG) in the field who also is the senior authority of all UN components can promote 
better cooperation, coordination and faster decision cycles. The UN civilian control structure 
developed in Cambodia (UNTAC) and the initial lack of the same in Bosnia highlights the 
advantages of having such structures in the field. In addition to the SRSG role, UNTAC had a 
civilian structure in all the 21 provinces headed by a Director of Civilian Affairs with a 
military commander, a UN Civilian police commander and a human-rights officer by his side. 
                                                 
46
 Huntington, 1957. 
47
 CMOC is an office established by the military, outside military camps to facilitate cooperation.  
48
 Nicoletta Pirozzi, “UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon: Europe’s contribution”, European Security Review,  nr 30 
(September, 2006): http://www.isis-europe.org/ftp/Download/ESR30.Lebanon.pdf 
 24 
This was poorly developed in Bosnia with the civilian head of mission (Stoltenberg until 
1994) based in Geneva leaving much of the local diplomacy and politics to the military 
commanders. The problem was that lack of civilian control from an SRSG in the field led to 
lack of understanding of the military situation within the civilian leadership in the UN HQ, 
and lack of strategic and political situation awareness in the military command in Bosnia. 
Williams argue that the SRSG should have more power to exercise his/her authority and 
thereby better be able to pull a mission’s political, civil and military elements into a common 
approach.49  The same problems and the same recommendations are verified in a Swedish case 
study of the UN mission in Haiti (1995).50 The UN seems to have taken this into account today 
as the SRSG is stated to be the highest UN authority within a theatre of operations. 51 
However, contributing nations are those who decide if this is going to work or not, as they still 
have the opportunity to interfere in the chain of command. 
The problem of national interference and reluctance to delegate full authority to the UN 
is the greatest problem to effective command and control. The national interference increases 
with increasingly level of violence in the area of operations. The three operations in 
Cambodia, Somalia and Bosnia are good examples on how not to organise command and 
control. Berdal and Leifer are pointing at the problem in UNTAC with national intervention. 
Force Commander and SRSG had serious problems in securing loyalty from many of the 
battalions; some were even taking orders from their embassies in Phnom Phen. The hostile 
environment and many inexperienced troop contributing countries within the UN force were 
the main reasons for this problem.52 Williams is describing the experiences from Somalia 
(UNOSOM I and II) as a “Dies-United-Nations”53 and that four chains of command 
effectively operated. One to the UN, one to Washington, one used by the US Special Forces 
and a final one to contributing nations home governments. Dual command is always an issue, 
not only in UN operations, but also NATO, EU and other multinational command structures. 
The trend towards more “hybrid operations” in which the UN only will provide one 
component will probably imply that dual or even triple command problems will continue.54 
Learning to cope with such issues and involvement of troop contributing countries in the pre-
                                                 
49
 Williams, 1998. 
50
 See for instance: Leif Ahlquist (ed), Co-operation, Command and Control in UN Peace Support Operations 
(Stockholm: Nordstedts Tryckeri AB, 1998) and Rick Hooper and Mark Taylor, “Command from the Saddle: 
Managing United Nations peace-building missions” Fafo report 266 (Oslo: Centraltrykkeriet AS, 1999). 
51
 Annan, 2006, p. 3. 
52
 Berdal and Leifer, 2007, p 56. 
53
 Williams, 1998.p 47. 
54
 Bruce Jones, with Feydal Cherif, 2003.  
 25 
planning will probably reduce such intervening. A clear understanding of the situation in the 
field, and that it can develop to the worse is very important discussing the mandate of the 
mission. 
Coordination and cross sector communication is one answer to cope with the problems 
of command and control. The lessons from Cambodia is that a mutual understanding of each 
others roles, cultural differences, ability to communicate and to understand the new 
environment is equally important as having a coordination structure. The UNTAC mission had 
joint civil-military structure, joint civil-military coordination groups and also conducted joint 
operations with the civilian side. Despite all these structures and mechanisms coordination was 
difficult to achieve. The military had initial resistance to adjust to the supporting role, sharing 
information with civilians were not common in the military culture and doing joint operations 
with police and civilian electoral observers was strange for most of the troops. The 
consequence of the development in these operations was that military had to change their 
mentality and also establish new functions like the CIMIC in their structures and within their 
staffs. 
The changes towards a more civil-military structure in the field and the need for better 
planning and coordination were also mirrored at the UN HQ level. The UN created and 
restructured the military as well as the humanitarian functions within the HQ. The Department 
of Humanitarian Affairs (later OCHA) was established in 1992 and the office responsible for 
peacekeeping was reorganised as the Department for Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) the 
same year, in order to improve the capacity to plan, conduct and manage operations. The 
political, operational, logistics, civil police, de-mining, training, personnel and administrative 
sections were all co-located under DPKO. Further in 1993 the Situation Centre was 
established in order to maintain around the clock communications with the field and provide 
information necessary to missions and troop contributors. However there has been a 
continuous complaint towards the capacity within DPKO especially on the ability to plan, and 
command large operations. This was highlighted in the Brahimi Report, and is still under 
debate. The problem today is that the UN again has reached all time high in number of 
operations and the capacity within DPKO again is stretched beyond its limits.55 Again 
restructure of the DPKO is on the agenda to be able to support the increasingly number of 
complex peacekeeping operations the UN are involved in.  
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The growth of the humanitarian sector and the civilian actors  
The growth of the humanitarian sector is the other dimension important to understand as it can 
be considered as one of the catalysts for integration of the UN efforts. This sector has evolved 
with the transformation of peacekeeping and developed to be one of the main tools for UN 
involvement in peace-building efforts. The humanitarian sector consists of civilian non-profit 
organisations working with humanitarian activity like relief, recovery and development. There 
is a distinction between humanitarian relief and development, but many organisations work in 
both spheres. For the argument in this chapter I will treat all under the generic name 
humanitarian sector. The sector can be categorised as follows: Donor governments, including 
government organisations (GOs), Intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and non governmental organisations (NGOs).56 The 
donor governments provide financial support for IGOs and NGOs. The main IGOs come from 
the UN system: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 
the World Food Programme (WFP) and the UN development Programme (UNDP). Despite 
being UN organisations these organisations do not answer to the Secretary General but to 
autonomous governing boards and are operating according to distinct mandates, which may 
explain why it can be difficult to get them on board in an integrated structure.57 The private 
organisations, the NGOs are divided in national and international NGOs (INGO). Some 
examples of the largest INGOs are: CARE, Oxfam, Save the Children, World Vision, 
Mêdicins sans Frontiers, Catholic relief Service, Mercy Corps and the International Rescue 
Committee. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is regarded as a category of 
its own, since it has specific recognition in international humanitarian law. It has observer 
status in the UN General Assembly, and its chief delegate meets weekly with the president of 
the Security Council.  
The humanitarian sector was dominated by ICRC and the classic UN agencies 
established in the 1950s and 60s. UNICEF was established in 1946, UNHCR in 1951 and 
World Food Programme 1961. The sector has evolved with conflicts and disasters, and 
exploded with the surge in conflicts in the 1990s. The international response was to intervene 
with military force to stabilize the conflicts and create a secure environment for the 
humanitarian work. This created access for more civilian actors and organisations and 
ultimately the market grow. Thomas Weiss argues that the military deployment into crisis and 
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conflict areas has facilitated a six fold increase in emergency spending the last decade. ICRC 
had almost monopoly over emergency delivery until the mid 1980s. From only 700 NGOs in 
1939, the number of international NGOs (operating in more than three countries) were 
estimated to be around 20 000 in 1995. Updated numbers from another source show that the 
number had risen to 50 000 in 2002. “Near 90 percent of them has been formed since 1970 and 
they disperse more money than the UN ($7billon in 2002)”.58 Another indicator proving the 
growth of the sector is the humanitarian costs of the wars in 1990s. Official development 
assistance devoted to relief, grew from $1 billion in 1990 to almost $5, 9 billion in 2000.59 
UNHCR had 20 NGO partners in the1960s of which half were large international NGOs. 
Between 1994 and 2003 UNHCR channelled $3-4 billions through over 700 NGO partners of 
which 419 were local or national NGOs.60 Today the organisation has a staff of around 6,689 
people operating in 116 countries with annual budget of $1 billion.61 This development and 
surge in numbers of INGO`s and NGOs led to dual efforts and competition in getting funding 
from donors.  
 The result of this surge and competition was a call for coordination and strategic 
guidance. This started with the General Assembly resolution 46/182 intended to strengthen the 
UN response to both complex emergencies and natural disasters.62 Following this resolution 
several new strategic coordination bodies were established. The position of Emergency Relief 
Coordinator (ERC) and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) were created in 1992. 
DHA expanded the mandate to include the coordination of humanitarian response, policy 
development and humanitarian advocacy in 1998 and was renamed to the Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The resolution also created the Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee (IASC) which is the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination of 
humanitarian assistance. The IASC is chaired by the Emergency Relief Coordinator and 
ensures inter-agency decision-making in response to complex emergencies. Participants 
include all humanitarian partners, from UN agencies, funds and programmes to the Red Cross 
Movement and NGOs. The latest development within this sector is that in 2005, the IASC and 
its partners agreed to establish the so called “cluster approach” to their efforts, which implies 
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that there will be a lead agency in nine different areas of humanitarian activity.63  This 
approach is also to be implemented in the field and coordinated by the Humanitarian 
Coordinator (HC) and Resident Coordinator (RC). OCHA will be the lead agency when it 
comes to coordination and mobilising humanitarian action and also the core coordinator 
between all humanitarian agencies in the field, while the UNDP will be the lead agency within 
long term development efforts. 64 The head of the UN agencies, funds and programmes in a 
particular country will compose what is called a UN Country Team (UNCT). The RC will be 
the leader of this team which will be working on long term projects. The UN Country Team65, 
the RC and the HC will be important cooperation bodies in planning and execution of 
Integrated Mission if the concept is to work as hoped for.   
Summing up this chapter:  
This chapter has reviewed why integration has become the main issue in UN approach to 
peace operations. It has pointed at some lessons learned from operations during the pioneer 
work of the early and mid 1990s. The new environment provided new challenges to the UN 
peacekeeper as well as the UN humanitarian actors. The UN mission structure changed from 
pure military to combined civil-military structures as also happened at HQ level. The 
development created a market for privatisation of the humanitarian sector and ultimately the 
theatre of operations became more crowded with actors. Competition and lack of coordination 
and cooperation characterized the situation throughout the 1990s. Both the humanitarian and 
the peacekeeping sector of the UN started their reform processes in the early 1990s, and have 
established and still are working to improve their coordination mechanisms. The Brahimi 
report highlighted the need for comprehensive planning involving all relevant actors as a key 
to improve the approaches to the UN peacekeeping efforts.66 The aim was not only to maintain 
status quo, but also to actively influence the situation, addressing both the immediate security 
problems and the root causes of the conflicts. Finally the chapter has pointed on the complex 
of actors involved in the humanitarian and developing sector which the military arm of a peace 
keeping mission has to cope with in an integrated context. 
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3 Planning and structuring of UN Integrated Missions, a theoretical framework 
According to the Report on Integrated Missions there is no common organisational model or 
definition of what an Integrated Mission should look like, or how it should be designed.  Stuart 
Gordon identifies two principal versions in his study, one maximalist and a minimalist version. 
The former implies that OCHA is fully integrated within the UN`s overall mission structure 
(UN mission in Afghanistan is an example), and the minimalist is that OCHA has a separate 
identity focusing on coordination and information sharing rather than unified organisational 
framework (UN mission in Côte d`lvoire is one example).67 The main point from the Report 
on Integrated Mission is that “form must follow function”68, which means that the design 
should be adapted to the situation on the ground and the strategy the UN are to follow. So 
what is really an Integrated Mission? The report is suggesting the following definition, “an 
instrument with witch the UN seeks to help countries in transition from war to peace, or 
address a similarly complex situation that requires a system-wide UN response, through 
subsuming various actors and approaches within an overall political-strategic crisis 
management network”.69 The SG guidelines is focusing on linking the different dimensions of 
peacekeeping and peace-building and says “an Integrated Mission is based on a common 
strategic plan and a shared understanding of the priorities and types of programme 
interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process”.70 Further 
the SG`s guidelines is focused on structure and processes to facilitate communication and 
coordination between the Mission and the UN agencies already present in the country. Clearly 
the concept is about making the UN better in thinking strategy, involving all their tools and 
thinking longer term commitment to their efforts.  
The central idea with the Integrated Mission is that the actors involved in a 
peacekeeping/ peace-building effort are to bee better coordinated, and that they all are working 
towards a common agreed end state for the peace-building effort. In order to achieve that, it is 
necessary to have a strategic and operational planning process that brings all actors together. 
Agreement on goals, priorities and phases of the operation is vital to successful transition from 
conflict to peace. When integrated planning is achieved and a strategy agreed upon, the next 
step is the challenge to put that into effect on the ground. This will involve coordination, de 
confliction, prioritising etc. As the situation evolves in theatre, adjustments and new priorities 
are needed. All this activity will demand a well functioning command and control structure as 
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well as mechanisms for coordination at the tactical level. This chapter will describe and 
explain how this structure and processes is intended to function in a UN integrated context. It 
will present a model of the Integrated Mission in the wider context, the linkage between the 
long term and short term commitment. Further it will describe how the integrated planning is 
intended to take place in order to achieve this linkage. Finally the chapter will present how the 
structure and processes is supposed to work at field level.  
Status of the Integrated Mission  
First it is useful to review the status of the Integrated Mission as it has developed since the 
critical report from 2005. Several improvements have taken place and it seems that policy 
documents and guidelines are beginning to manifest both in the peacekeeping sector (DPKO) 
and in the humanitarian sector (OCHA). First of all the SG issued his guidelines in 2006, 
clarifying the relationship and authority of the SRSG and Deputy SRSG who also will act as 
the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and Resident Coordinator (RC). This will give the SRSG 
ability to coordinate and control the effort between the peacekeeping mission and the actors 
within the humanitarian and development sector. DPKO has developed an “Integrated 
Planning Process (IMPP)” which aims to pull the actors together in planning for a mission. 
DPKO has also issued policy documents to every peacekeeping mission, regarding structural 
changes within the mission HQs (Establishment of Joint Operations Centres (JOC) and Joint 
Mission Analysis Centres (JMAC). At strategic level the Peace Building Commission (PBC) 
and the Peace Building Support Office (PBSO) has been established to advise and propose 
integrated strategies for post-conflict recovery.71 The commission has started their work 
focusing on the two follow up peace-building missions in Burundi and Sierra Leone which can 
be regarded as test beds for how this commission develops.72 Clearly it is an indication that the 
UN is taking steps to plan longer term commitment also after a peacekeeping mission has 
ended. The humanitarian sector has as mentioned in previous chapter taken steps to strengthen 
in-country coordination and also to strengthen their network and cooperation with DPKO 
when it comes to integrated planning. The OCHA`s focal point for the IMPP will “work with 
DPKO on overall, planning and lessons learned related to Integrated Missions and will ensure 
that humanitarian concerns are fully reflected in the planning process”.73 
                                                 
71
 United Nations, S/RES/1645. 
72
 Carolyn Mc Askie, Open debate of the Security Council 31 Jan 2007. Available at: 
http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/pdf/mcaskie31jan07.pdf  
73
 Nancy Lucas (managing editor), OCHA in 2007 (Geneva, OCHA, 2007), p. 35. Available at: 
http://ochaonline.un.org/DocView.asp?DocID=5326 
 31 
The complex of actors in an integrated wider context 
In the previous chapter I described the complex of actors within the humanitarian community, 
the UN Country Team, the HC/RC role and the multitude of humanitarian and development 
actors operating in the theatre of operations in which a peacekeeping mission is to deploy. In 
order to get a clearer picture of the overall context, a model of the operational context is 
useful. The model will present a generic peacekeeping and peace-building environment. It will 
present the different phases a peace-building effort evolves through in transition from war to 
long lasting peace, and finally how the actors relate to each other and how ranking of priorities 
change as the operation evolves. The model is a modification of a similar model described in 
the UN “Capstone Doctrine” draft74, but can be seen as a synthesis of the literature studied for 
the topic. 
 
Figure 1: The Integrated Mission in a wider context 
 
Between the two extreme points from war to peace, it is a period of international and local 
effort involving many different actors. When a war ends, and a peace agreement or a cease fire 
agreement is reached, and if the parties agree to a peacekeeping presence, the UN will 
authorize a peacekeeping mission, either established by the UN or a regional organisation. The 
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model shows how a peace-building effort from the different actors evolves through three broad 
phases: stabilization, transition and consolidation.75 These phases are not fixed or time 
bounded and does not have absolute boundaries. They will overlap, and the different actors 
may switch back-and forth between the phases depending on how the situation evolves.  
The stabilisation phase follows immediately after the cease-fire/ peace agreement and 
the priority is to establish a safe and secure environment and to manage the immediate 
consequences of the war. Humanitarian relief and helping the local population which is 
occupied with basic survival and re-organisation of their lives is the main effort. This phase 
varies in length but traditionally it will last from 3- 12 months.76 The transition phase will 
typically start with establishment of an interim government, followed by some type of election 
to select a transitional government. The priorities changes from humanitarian relief to 
development efforts like recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation. The peacekeeping forces 
may change in structure, lower their profile and change their priorities towards supporting the 
development actors. This phase may last from one to three years or longer. The consolidation 
phase is focused on supporting the elected government and the civil society. Development 
programmes, security sector reform programs, reintegration of earlier combatants into society 
and so on are the core issues. The peacekeeping force will handle more responsibility to the 
local government, and the UN Country Team.  Dependent on the situation, and the strength of 
the local leadership and government, the UN may establish a political peace-building mission 
in order to support the local leaders and make sure that the country not relapses into conflict 
again. To often has the UN ended their engagement with the peacekeeping mission to early 
and used the election as a benchmark for end state.  
The model shows that the UNDP and the country team will be present in theatre 
already before a conflict erupts. As the conflict evolves, humanitarian actors will enter the 
scene to take care of immediate humanitarian relief. If diplomacy succeeds and peace 
agreement is reached, a peacekeeping force will be prepared. Since the UN not have any rapid 
response force, a regional military force will be given the responsibility of the initial 
stabilization of the situation. Examples from missions in Sierra Leone, Timor Leste, Haiti, 
Côte d`lvoire, Liberia, Sudan show that the UN will need time to generate forces, funds, 
equipment and so on. In Haiti the US led Multinational Interim Force (MIF) which deployed 
in March 2004 was replaced by the larger UN mission 3 months later. In Côte d`lvoire the 
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ECOWAS (Economic Community Of West African States) forces established in 2003, was 
replaced by a larger UN force (UNOCI) in April 2004. In Burundi the AU (African Union) led 
mission established in 2003 was replaced by UN (ONUB) after 12 months.77 Such initial 
stabilisation forces have limited capacities and are normally only capable of focusing on basic 
military tasks, securing vital areas so that the UN force can be generated and deployed. The 
UN brings a civil-military capacity and will incorporate a broad spectrum of civilian effort as 
well. The UN mission may take over the whole mission from the regional organisation or it 
may establish a parallel mission as in Kosovo. However the ideal for an Integrated Mission is 
to have all components, military and civilian under the umbrella of the UN, reporting through 
the SRSG. 
As the mission progress, the number of actors will grow. Humanitarian relief will 
dominate the initial period and evolve gradually to involve more development actors. Tasks 
changes from relief to reconstruction, capacity building, re-integration and supporting the local 
government. The peacekeeping force will change structure and profile as time evolves and 
situation changes. From having a large and robust military component in the beginning it will 
downsize, and change the tasks from security to peace-building efforts. The UN traditionally 
establishes “new” missions with new names, new structure and mandates as the situation 
evolves. A good example can be found in the UN operations in Timor Leste since 1999. As the 
violence in Timor Leste escalated in the summer of 1999, the chapter VI based UN mission 
(UNAMET) was replaced with a chapter VII International Force to East Timor (INTERFET) 
to restore peace. The UN established a transitional administration (as they did in Kosovo) late 
1999. INTERFET was replaced with a new robust UN mission (UNTAET) in 2000. This 
mission ended with the successful elections and independence declarations in 2002. Following 
this, the UN established a UN support mission (UNMISET) which focused on capacity 
building, police training and support to the elected government. The Timorese government 
gradually assumed responsibility for managing day to day affairs, and in 2005 this mission 
was replaced with a Peace Building Office (UN office in Timor Leste). This mission had no 
military component and consisted largely by advisers and observers. In 2006 the UN 
established a new police dominated mission (UN Integrated Mission in Timor Leste) to 
support the local police in upholding law and order.78 The example from Timor Leste shows 
how the UN adapts and changes their priorities as the situation evolves on the ground. The 
problem is that there is a tendency to perceive the different missions as separate and not part of 
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a larger, long term strategy, at least among those who criticise the UN and are looking for 
failed missions.  
The model shows that the SRSG arrives with the UN Integrated Peacekeeping Mission 
and establish the link to the humanitarian and development community through his Deputy 
SRSG, which also is to be the HC/RC. SRSG is to be the highest UN authority in theatre and 
thereby control or at least coordinate the UN`s overall strategy within theatre.79 Traditionally 
the UN humanitarian coordinators and resident coordinators have remained outside the 
peacekeeping structure and not been part of a UN military dominated intervention. As 
mentioned in the introduction this has also been one of the main reasons for the resistance 
towards the concept. However one of the big challenges will be to integrate long term 
humanitarian and development plans with the shorter term focused planning which 
characterises the peacekeeping mission. A peacekeeping mission has to date been planned for 
short time efforts, while the UN Country Teams are working in 10-20 years timeframes. 
OCHA and UNHCR`s annual planning cycles are setting strategic objectives for their 
priorities and focus on a yearly basis. The UNHCR is for instance conducting their annual 
planning exercise at country level with all their partners and NGOs in the first quarter of the 
year which ends in the Country Operations Plan. This plan describes operational goals, sector 
objectives, priorities and budgets are distributed.80  The planning of an Integrated Mission 
must take such practical facts into account, and the SRSG can not have too large expectations 
to influence and change these plans when arriving in theatre. Involvement of the humanitarian 
sector, the UN Country Team will thereby be of outmost importance, not only to tap them for 
information, but to coordinate and de-conflict such practical issues as the different actor’s 
plans and focus of effort, and possibilities and opportunities for cooperation and mutual 
support. 
The planning for an Integrated Mission 
Integrated planning implies that the process at the strategic as well as the operational level take 
all relevant actors into account. Ideally the planning must incorporate, from the beginning, a 
comprehensive peace building approach that addresses the causes as well as the symptoms of 
the conflict. The Report on Integrated Mission highlighted the “lack of strategic culture and 
strategic guidance in the UN planning processes”.81  The new idea is that any peace operation 
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should be evaluated in a longer term and in a wider context which means to integrate the 
humanitarian and development programs into the process. The peacekeeping mission and the 
concept of operations (CONOPS) will in addition to addressing the imminent security needs 
also be adapted and adjusted to the UN Country Team and humanitarian effort. The practical 
consequences will be that the UN peacekeepers will avoid duplication of efforts, it will imply 
better coordination and de-confliction between the humanitarian sector and the peacekeepers.  
The Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) is the basis planning tool for all new 
missions. At the strategic level the Peace Building Support Office (PBSO) is intended to 
provide long term strategic input to the planning process. When a situation occurs and the 
Security Council decides to establish a UN Mission an Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) 
will be established. This is an ad-hoc planning staff composed of the relevant departments and 
agencies, as well as representatives from the UN Country Team (UNCT). The military, police, 
logistics, political, humanitarian, development, and human rights arms of the UN is vital in the 
process. The planning staff will change in structure as the process goes on, it may be expanded 
or reduced depending on priorities and needs. The planning process evolves through three 
broad stages: “advance planning”, “operational planning” and “review and transition 
planning”.82 The advance planning is the strategic assessment which will be an analysis of the 
situation on the ground, humanitarian situation, existing UN and other activities etc. The aim 
is to give the SG a clear understanding of the in-country situation and the dynamics of the 
conflict, clarify goals, identify risks, and develop strategies accordingly. The PBSO together 
with the UNCT will be vital in this stage to provide the information and analysis needed to 
establish a Strategic Planning Directive, which is the SGs directive to start the operational 
planning. This directive gives the strategic objectives, it reflects the interagency support, and it 
formally designates DPKO to take lead in the IMPP process. 
The next step is the foundation planning which aims to develop the comprehensive 
concept of operations for the Integrated Mission for submission to the UN Security Council. 
The most important part of this stage will be the so called “technical survey” which deploys to 
the theatre to conduct country level assessment and thereby will be the critical window to 
involve and deepen the involvement of the UNCT and other actors involved in the operation. 
The IMTF will also designate some members of the team to remain in country to support the 
UNCT involvement in the process and the UNCT may also send members to the UNHQ to 
participate in the process within DPKO. The result of the technical survey is the draft mission 
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plan. Budget planning is also done in an integrated manner which means that the budget 
planning group works closely with the UNCT to ensure understanding of resource gaps, and 
optimize synergies between the peacekeeping force and the UNCT. In other words it may save 
costs, or it may imply that the Peacekeeping Mission must enter theatre with more assets in 
order to be able to support the UNCT. The key output of this stage is the SG report which is 
detailing the concept of operations (CONOPS). This report will be submitted to the Security 
Council which then will result in authorisation to a mandate.  
The planning process will now enter the more detailed stage of operational planning 
aiming to develop the Advanced Draft Mission Plan, the Mission Budget Report and the 
Directive to the SRSG. The mission plan will provide the detailed operational strategy for 
implementing the mandate and the framework for achieving integration and coherence. 
Mission objectives, mission structure, coordination mechanisms, command and control 
arrangements including relationships with the UNCT, thematic and functional strategies 
(DDR, Human Rights, rule of law, protection of civilians, etc) will be formulated. The 
Directive to the SRSG initiates the transfer of the planning responsibility to the Peacekeeping 
Mission. When the SRSG and his planning team takes over most of the details will be sorted 
out, therefore it is important that key leaders (SRSG, Force Commander, and Police 
Commissioner) are involved in the IMTF process as early as possible. SRSG together with the 
senior managers will establish what is called an Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT) 
which will finalise the mission plan. This will commence with an exercise at the country level 
to review and validate the plans, and end with the adoption of the finalized Mission Plan by 
the SRSG, and endorsement by the UNCT.  
 The result of this planning process which continuously is aiming to involve the UNCT 
will result in a mission plan which will be integrated in form, and contain objectives and tasks 
to all components, ranking of priorities, support to the UNCT and so on. The IMTF concept 
has not yet been fully implemented and DPKO has struggled to get all actors to the table. 
Some comments from a representative in the Military Division was that “changes takes time, 
when time is critical we tend to fall back into old habits…it has also been a problem that the 
different agencies are sending people with no authority to take decisions in the IMTF and that 
slower the whole process”.83 
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The Integrated Mission structure  
Having established a common, clear and integrated strategy with agreed vision and focus of 
effort, the next step is to put this into effect on the ground. As the previous chapter described 
the UN has developed their civil-military mission structure throughout the last decade of 
peacekeeping. However with the Integrated Mission follows additional structural changes as 
well. The Under Secretary General DPKO has given the establishment of integrated 
organisational structures at headquarters and in the field as a priority goal to improve 
integration in the operations.84 This paragraph will describe and explain how a generic mission 
structure will look like, with emphasis on the new functions that are intended to improve the 
integration at field level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Integrated Mission HQ structure85 
 
The structure and size of a UN mission depends on the task and the mandate that is given, but 
generally it consists of a military component headed by a Force Commander, a police 
component headed by a Police Commissioner and civilian component covering several sectors 
(political, electoral, judicial, legal, human rights, security and administrative support). They all 
sort under a common force headquarter (HQ) structure under the direct authority of the SRSG 
and his/her Senior Management Team (SMT). The components share a single mission budget 
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and have integrated support services. The integrated joint services within the HQ consist of 
the: Integrated Security Section (ISS), Joint Logistics centre (JLOC), the Joint Mission 
Analysis Centre (JMAC) and the Joint Operations Centre (JOC). These services are staffed by 
civil and military personnel and provide support to the whole mission.  
The figure above show how the HQ of a mission is organized. It may vary is size and 
form, but in principle it will look like this model. The SMT consists as mentioned of the senior 
commanders / managers of respective components. This team is a core function and a well 
functioning SMT can be considered as a pre-condition for success in implementing and 
execution of the Integrated Mission. As members of the SMT each senior leader will act in the 
corporate interests of the overall mission and the operation.  The SMT is a governance forum 
to discuss problems, set and review the Integrated Mission plan, decide on priorities and 
changes in plans. The team will meat regularly to support the decision-making of the SRSG 
and should provide a clear, unified strategic direction for all mission components.  From a 
military point of view the Force Commander will be the adviser to the SRSG on all military 
matters. The Deputy SRSG/ HC/RC will provide advises on the humanitarian and 
development side of the operation. The Police Commissioner naturally advice on law and 
order and local security matters which fall under police activities. The Chief Administration 
Officer (COA) is vital in order to create flexibility and endurance in the operations. COA is 
delegated financial authority within a tightly centralized UN financial management system, 
oversees the budget, financial operations, local procurement and property control. COA 
answers to the 5th committee (Administrative and Budgetary) in New York regarding the 
budget.86 
Two other vital functions to support the integrated approach within a mission are the 
Joint Operations Centre (JOC) and the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC). All missions 
have been given directions to establish these functions in a policy directive from DPKO.87 The 
intent is “to ensure that all peacekeeping missions have in place integrated operations 
monitoring, reporting and information analysis hubs at Mission headquarters to support the 
more effective integration mission-wide situational awareness, security information and 
analysis for SMT decision making”.88 The JOC provides a central point for the collection of 
operational information from the field in order to provide the mission’s senior leadership and 
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UNHQ with an accurate and up-to-date picture of the general situation throughout the area of 
operations and alert them to incidents that may require their attention.  During times of crisis, 
the JOC becomes the crisis management centre for the operation and ensures that senior 
managers are provided with the information required to make informed decisions. The JOC is 
jointly staffed and is supposed to be a 24-hour situational centre focusing on current day to 
day situation.89  
The JMAC provides the capacity to collect, and synthesise all-source information to 
produce medium and long term integrated analysis. JMAC products should provide the SMT 
with improved understanding of trends, implications and developments within the theatre of 
operations. Analytical products will provide basis for enhanced mission planning and decision 
making. The JMAC has an integrated structure, designed to encourage contribution from all 
components of the mission. Joint input as well as joint analysis and output is the idea behind 
this function. In military terms this can be compared to a J2 cell which collects information 
from a multitude of sources, analyses the information and provide intelligence to the mission. 
In UN there is still aversion towards the term “intelligence”, and according to a Force 
Commander “we don’t talk about intelligence in UN, we call it information”90; however the 
JMAC will do essentially the same thing.  Qualified analysts are required in the JMAC which 
for the military means intelligence experience. Both functions (JOC and JMAC) are to liaise 
and share information with the UNCT and as appropriate non UN entities in the country. The 
staffing of these functions will reflect the multidimensional composition of the mission. The 
policy document states that these functions shall be prioritized and established as first priority 
in new missions; however it also states that these structures are not to replace any existing 
management, command or decision making structures at any level.91 Ongoing missions are 
supposed to establish these from their current structures, which will imply to thin out current 
staffs, or as many missions have done, rely on the military headquarters.  
The UN logistic system is composed of a mixture of capabilities provided by national 
military logistic units, UN international civil servants, UN field service support personnel, 
Host Nation Support and contracted services. National Support Elements (NSE) is integrated 
into the overall UN logistics support system, but remains under national command. The 
logistic functions which are considered to be common to the mission as a whole is; provision 
of accommodation, infrastructure, civil engineering and geographical systems, transport 
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resources, major vehicle repair and maintenance services, movement control and air or 
riverine/ maritime support services, installation and maintenance of mission wide 
communications, medical and dental services, provision of general supply items (water, fuel, 
rations, construction and defence materials).92 Critical operational and strategic capacities like 
aviation are separated as an independent component serving the whole mission, as well as 
other missions in the same region. One example is the aviation section in the Mission in DR 
Congo (MONUC) which has grown to become a major aircraft operator operating a fleet of 86 
aircraft and 1, 647 personnel. This aviation section is supporting over 60 airports and airfields, 
as well as over 150 landing sites across the Mission area.93 This section is now serving the 
missions in Burundi and Sudan as well. Aviation also serves non UN actors in respective areas 
of operations.  
The main problem with the UN logistic system is that it is not geared to the dynamics 
of modern peacekeeping which are required to switch to a more robust posture and back again 
at various points in its lifecycle. It is a reality that UN field operations continue to be 
constrained by complex bureaucratic procedures conceived in a non-operational context.94  A 
mission that has an administration which is flexible enough to adapt quickly to changing 
circumstances on the ground clearly stands a better chance of success.  This requires good 
logistic planning and re-sourcing and close integration between the uniformed and 
administrative components of a mission. The Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC) is the 
focal point for cooperation and mutual assistance between the mission and other agencies 
including NGOs. The JLOC brings together logistics officers from all participating entities, 
conduct information sharing, and joint planning of movement control, use of airfields, sea 
ports, access routes and so on.  
  This paragraph has explained the Integrated Mission overall structure. New integrated 
services common to the whole mission in the JOC and JMAC functions which will provide the 
SRSG and the Senior Management Team with up-dated situational awareness and medium to 
long term analysis to give the leaders basis for clear decisions. The SMT is to direct and set 
priorities for the mission. Joint Logistics is vital in order to sustain the mission and the 
Integrated Mission will probably open more access for the humanitarian community to the UN 
logistics. This will most likely put more pressure on the UN logistic system, especially when it 
comes to transport and air assets. This will require a reform of the financial system from the 
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strategic level. The mission HQ has traditionally been kept as small as possible to save costs, 
but clearly there is possible to see the contours of a joint integrated headquarters occur. The 
consequences of this will probably that the military component must expand their staffing and 
establish JOCs and JMACs at the mission HQ level. To the military component this will 
probably demand more intelligence and analytical expertise as well as operational level 
experience.  
The Military Components role and function in the Integrated Mission 
The military component is vital to most UN peacekeeping. The structure of the force varies in 
accordance with the given tasks and mandate. Normally the force will consists of national 
formed units (company, battalion or even brigade size units), military observers, staff officers, 
liaisons officers and advisers. The forces are normally deployed in sectors and taking 
responsibility over designated areas. The military force includes most of the standard military 
functions like combat forces, combat service and support, and logistic units. The military 
primary function is to provide a safe and secure environment in the theatre of operations, and 
the secondary role is to provide support to the other components. Security is a precondition for 
moving ahead with the other elements of the peace-building process. There is several 
examples in ongoing missions that lack of a secure environment will hamper the peace-
building effort and slower the progress (Iraq and Afghanistan are two current examples). 
Typical military tasks are: Support to peacemaking and political negotiations 
(advisers), liaison to parties, observation, surveillance and monitoring, interposition between 
belligerents, provide a secure environment, support disarmament demobilisation and 
reintegration (DDR), mine and explosive clearance, enforcement of sanctions, support security 
sector reform, support to maintain law and order, and support the humanitarian activities with 
logistics and security. The military has increasingly been tasked to protect civilians under 
chapter VII mandates and most missions have this as a standard task in their mandates.95 The 
military component is also involved in development tasks and projects within their areas of 
deployment. Such activities are in UN terms called “Community Support”96 which is activities 
undertaken in support of the community to improve conditions and build confidence in the 
peace process (NATO would call this “hearts and minds” campaigns”). The spectrum of tasks 
has steadily been growing with the increasingly complex environment and actors involved. 
The figure below shows how the military component relates to the other components and 
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functions within an Integrated Mission. The model clarifies the SMT, the components and how 
they contribute to a common mission objective.  
 
Figure 3: The Military Role in Integrated Mission 
 
The military function and role does not change in principle in the Integrated Mission context. 
The primary role is still to provide security and uphold stability in the theatre of operations 
and priority must be given to the military tasks.  However with the Integrated Mission 
structure and approach, some new challenges can be identified. As mentioned in previous 
paragraphs the military must contribute staff officers into the JOC and JMAC structures and 
probably be those who establish and operate these. The military command structure already 
have a command and control system, they have the communication assets, the skills in running 
operation centres and also intelligence (J2) elements which will be important in these 
structures. When it comes to support and coordination with the other components within the 
mission this is solved through normal coordination and communication between the staffs. 
Changes of main efforts, requests for larger support to future operations will be lifted to the 
SMT who discusses, evaluate the overall picture and consequences and take decisions.  
The other important consequence to the military in an integrated context is to support 
the humanitarian and development actors if requested and decided by the SMT. With the 
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integrated concept this will be better planned, coordinated and probably demand more 
recourses from the logistic and engineer units as the mission progress towards the transition 
phase. The model above shows that the humanitarian and development actors and 
organisations not formally are integrated into the peacekeeping structure but that the Deputy 
SRSG/ HC/RC is the linking point between the mission and the UNCT. HC/RC is the focal 
point for coordination at the senior command level, and all requests for military support will in 
principle go through HC/RC and be decided in the SMT. However the practical coordination 
on the ground will be done through normal CIMIC functions which will be established at the 
different levels within the Mission.    
Civil Military Coordination and cooperation is regulated in DPKOs policy document, 
“Civil-Military Coordination Policy”.97 This document acknowledges that the resources and 
capabilities unique to formed units allow for a broader range of interaction in the non-security 
area. This includes use of military resources to provide support to humanitarian relief and the 
military’s participation in reconstruction and rehabilitation projects as parts of the overall 
development effort. It is stressed that such support must be complementary and avoids 
duplication. The policy document is developed in cooperation with OCHA to facilitate 
coordination with the humanitarian community. However it should be noted that the 
humanitarian agencies have agreed on a common policy that they will normally only request 
or accept support from military or civilian police based on three requirements: 1) the 
capability must be unique, 2) the capability cannot be provided in a timely manner and 3) use 
of military and civilian police is a last resort. The core document on the humanitarian side is 
the “Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies”.98 Despite these basic principles 
the attitude varies within the civilian community, especially when it comes to the NGOs. 
Some will not interact with the military at all (MSF) and some are more relaxed and adapts to 
the situation.  
When it comes to command and control during civil led operations the military units 
will not be under civilian command but remain in their established command and control 
status. UN military support to tasks outside the mission will normally be limited by funding 
which not cover such tasks. National contingents who receive resources through national 
channels to conduct projects in their designated area must coordinate this effort through the 
missions CIMC structure in order to avoid duplication and interruption of ongoing or planned 
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activities from the civilian sector. Trust funds can also be established for recourses that are 
provided outside the UN system from nations or other volunteer organisations. 
Looking behind such formalities, if an Integrated Mission is to succeed the 
coordination and communication between the military and civilian actors, inside the mission 
as well as outside the mission is important. As we learned in chapter two on the UN operation 
in Cambodia, despite all structures, coordination was difficult due to human factors and 
cultural differences. Unity of effort within a mission does not occur automatically and demand 
open minded flexible and professional officers and troops. UN missions consist of an average 
of more than 40 different nationalities99, which implies significant cultural differences, both 
national and professional. Such differences must be respected, understood, appreciated and 
managed. Clash of cultures will occur within the military units, the force and between the 
military and civilian personnel. Many civilian organisations and governments function with a 
high degree of ambiguity, while the military has a result oriented and brief oriented culture. 
The civilians don’t have the planning culture as the military has, they rather want to discuss 
matters, and has time to wait with the decision until they have more information. 100 The 
military is action oriented, and tends to rush to decisions and finish the task. It is even 
mentioned in the UNHCRs field guide to military interaction; “A military operation is 
focussed on achieving the stated objective, the “end state”, completing the mission, and “going 
home”.101 Reconciling these differing “institutional cultures” is a major challenge for 
commanders in integrated operations as well as in other multi-national peacekeeping 
operations.  On the other hand, cultural diversity is one of the UN’s main strengths, and 
comparative advantage and has to be harnessed, despite the occasional difficulties it may 
create.  
Summing up this chapter 
This chapter has reviewed the concept of Integrated Mission through theoretical models of the 
operational context a mission will operate within. The peace-building effort evolves through 
three broad phases, stabilisation, transition and consolidation. The UN Integrated Mission will 
likely take over responsibility from a regional military force, it will enter a context witch 
already have presence of other actors, civilian and military. The UN Country Team will in 
most cases have operated in the area over a long time, and has already a long term strategy for 
development in the area. The humanitarian effort will increase as the military establish 
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security in the theatre of operations and evolve towards reconstruction and recovery as the 
operation progress. Integrated Mission is about linking the short term peacekeeping with the 
longer term peace-building and to develop a unified strategy within the UN system. Planning 
must thereby include the UNCT and other stakeholders from the beginning and the 
relationship must be strengthened as the planning progress to the field level. Having 
established common agreed strategy and plans between the humanitarian/ development and the 
peacekeeping force the next step is to put this into effect on the ground. The mission will 
establish joint integrated service functions like; Joint Operations Centre (JOC), Joint Mission 
Analysis Centre (JMAC), Integrated Support Services (ISS) and Joint Logistic Operations 
Centre (JLOC). The military component will be vital in establishing these functions; however 
they should all have civil-military structures. 
The SRSG, the Force Commander, the Police Commissioner, the Chief Administration 
Officer and the Deputy SRSG/HC/RC is the senior management team of the mission and the 
focal point for coordination, guidance, change of priorities, setting policies and operational 
guidance to the mission. The military primary role is to establish and maintain a safe and 
secure environment so that the peace-building effort can progress, and to focus on the military 
tasks given in the mandate. Secondary role is to support the civilian sector in humanitarian 
relief and also development effort if that is possible and wanted by the HC/RC. All military 
support and involvement in civil operations must be coordinated through the missions CIMIC 
structure and with the HC/RC. CIMIC functions will be important in order to facilitate mutual 
understanding and support between the military and the UNCT and humanitarian actors. 
Policy documents regulate the support to civil operations. Cultural awareness and ability to 
understand each others roles, professional and national culture is important to succeed with 
Integrated Missions. Communication and coordination across components is essential.  
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4 Case study UNMIS – A Unified Mission           
The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was established by the Security Council Resolution 1590 
on 24 March 2005 to support the Sudanese peace process and assist the parties implementing 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 9 January 2005, which put an end to a 21 year 
long civil war between the north and south Sudan.102 The Secretary General (SG) stressed the 
importance of unity of effort and a unified strategy within the UN system, agencies, funds and 
programmes in establishing this mission. The mission has a seven year perspective; it has a 
comprehensive strategy, a unified mission plan and clearly intends to assist the Sudanese 
people to establish a long lasting peace.103 UNMIS mandate was expanded to support a similar 
peace agreement in Darfur (Darfur Peace Agreement of 5 May 2006) by Resolution 1706 on 
31 August 2006. This chapter will not discuss this part of the UNMIS mandate in detail but 
focus on the mission founded in resolution 1590 which illustrates the points of discussion 
regarding the Integrated Mission approach. This chapter intends to explore and discuss how 
UNMIS has approached the concept of Integrated Missions. The aim is to bring the theory into 
practice and ultimately answer some of the challenges and implications to the military 
component. The chapter will start with a description of the background to the conflict then the 
basis for the UNMIS mandate and mission will be described. The discussion will then be 
focused on the factors described in previous chapter; the planning, the structure with 
integrated services, and the military component with its role and functions.  
Background 
Sudan is the largest country in Africa and Middle East in terms of area. It is the size of 
Western Europe with an area of 2, 5 million square kilometres (See map in appendix C). The 
distances form western borders along Chad to the eastern border along the coastline of the Red 
Sea is about 1750km, and the distance from the Egyptian border in the north to the border of 
Uganda in the south is about 2050km. Sudan has common boarders with nine countries: Egypt 
and Libya in the north, Chad and the Central Africa Republic in the west, Zaire, Uganda and 
Kenya in the south and Ethiopia and Eritrea in the east. The population is estimated to be the 
39,379,358 in 2007.104 The Capital Khartoum located in the centre of the northern part of 
Sudan at the junction of the Blue and White Nile has over one million inhabitants, and with 
the districts around the population is over 4 million. Khartoum is the centre of all 
governmental institutions and federal ministries and most of the higher educational 
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institutions. In the South lies the regional Capital Juba with about 200 000 inhabitants.The city 
is a river port and the southern terminus of traffic along the White Nile. It is a strategic 
important city as a transportation hub with roads connecting it to Kenya, Uganda and DR 
Congo. Juba was under Government control throughout the civil wars and consequently 
became the main area of battle between the rebel forces Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ 
Army (SPLM/A) and Sudan Army Forces (SAF).105  The terrain in Sudan is generally flat 
plains, with mountain ranges in the West, South and in the East. The climate varies from the 
very dry deserts in the North to swampy rain forest in the South. Sudan’s rainy season lasts for 
about three months (July to September) in the north, and up to six months (June to November) 
in the south. The road net is badly developed in Sudan and much of the existing roads in the 
South were damaged during the war. The size of the country, the terrain, the climate and the 
limited infrastructure is a huge challenge for the UN and the international organizations 
working in the country.  
The signing of the peace agreement in 2005 between the Government of Sudan and 
SPLM/A ended Africa’s longest and most intractable wars of which more than two million 
people were killed, four million were uprooted and some 600,000 people fled the country as 
refugees.106 Since Sudan became independent from Britain and Egyptian rule in 1956, it has 
been at war for 34 years interrupted by 11 years of peace between 1972 and 1983. The 
insurgency campaign driven by SPLM/A has roots in the fear from the non-Arabic dominated 
southern people being dominated by the Arabs which is dominating in the North. According to 
Ian Johnstone the war has been about a range of issues: resources (oil, water, minerals and 
land areas), national identity and self determination. The war damaged Sudan's economy and 
led to food shortages, resulting in starvation and malnutrition. The main battlefield has been 
the southern areas (marked with red on the map in figure 4 below) leading to sever damage of 
infrastructure and community. The war had come to a stalemate and both parties saw the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement as a way out of a conflict that gradually eroded their own 
political authority. The South Sudan is granted a degree of autonomy for an interim period of 
six years, followed by an option of independence in 2011, while the North retains its 
dominance in the National Government and continues to apply Islamic (Shari a) laws.107   
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Figure 4: Sudan Conflict Areas108 
 
In addition to the main North-South civil war, there has been other, and still are ongoing 
conflicts in Sudan involving a multitude of other armed groups and parties. These are not 
covered in the CPA, but are influencing the situation and also the UNMIS forces and mission. 
The conflict in Darfur (see map above) is the most serious of these, involving rebellion groups, 
government forces and the so called “janjaweed” militia which is the Government of Sudan’s 
tool for conducting what they call a counter insurgency campaign.  The conflict has also 
spread into Chad which declared war on Sudan the 23rd December 2005.109 The humanitarian 
situation has increasingly worsened and OCHA estimated that over 2 million of the regions 6 
million people were IDPs in January 2007, 110many as a result of raids on villages by the 
janjaweed militia. The UN Security Council has adopted a number of resolutions on the 
conflict in Darfur, and the African Union (AU) was authorized to establish a monitoring 
mission in 2004, which now has been expanded to a protection force (AMIS) involving about 
7600 troops and police.111 In Eastern Sudan, along the borders toward Eritrea, there is also 
armed opposition towards the government by groups conducting sabotage attacks on oil 
pipelines and attacks on government patrols. In the South the Uganda based paramilitary 
group “Lords resistance Army” is operating along the border to Uganda and into southern 
Sudan towards Juba. The consequence of these wars is that the humanitarian situation in 
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Sudan is one of the main challenges to the stability and peace in the region. According to a 
USAID updated report,  IDPs in Sudan counted 5,7 million, of which 3,7 was from Southern 
Sudan, 2 million in Darfur and about 70 000 from East Sudan. Refugees in Sudan coming 
from neighboring conflicts in Eritrea, Uganda, and DR Congo counted 150000.112 
The civilian humanitarian efforts have been substantial and ongoing for a long time in 
Sudan. As the country has borders with nine other countries of which nearly all have been 
marked by conflicts since early 1960s the refugee problem has been constant for decades. 
UNHCR and the government of Sudan signed an agreement on cooperation regarding refugee 
affairs in 1967 which was the start of cooperation with the international community through 
the UNHCR.113 Since then and throughout the 1980s, refugee influxes have never come to a 
halt. The ongoing operation called “Operation Lifeline Sudan”114 was established in 1989 by 
the two UN agencies, UNICEF and the WFP and supported by more than 35 other INGO`s. 
UNDP is conducting the Sudan Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme (RRP).115 UNHCR 
has a major operation ongoing taking care of refugees, returnees and is working closely with 
other UN agencies, NGOs and local community organizations.116 The number of International 
organisations conducting humanitarian and development work has continuously grown, 
especially after the peace agreement was signed. In 2005 it was 13 UN agencies and more than 
35 INGOs working in Sudan, in 2007 there are 22 UN agencies, 8 NGOs, and 76 INGOs 
conducting a total of 776 different projects.117  The UN Country Team under the leadership of 
the Deputy SRSG /HC/RC, UNMIS has in other words a huge challenge in coordination of 
projects, funds and agencies. 
The basis for UNMIS mission and its mandate 
UNMIS is established on the basis of the peace agreement (CPA)118 from 2005 which consists 
of four protocols, two framework agreements and two annexes regarding the implementation 
modalities. This covers the areas where the parties have agreed and the requests to the 
international community to monitor and verify their agreements. It also covers requests for 
support from the international community when it comes to development, reconstruction and 
construction in war torn areas, particularly in southern areas. The process towards the signing 
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of the agreement was marked by several secondary goals and agreements which also made it 
possible for the UN to start preparations early and also establish an advance mission (UN 
Advance Mission to the Sudan) in 2004. In order to understand the UNMIS approach to their 
Mission and modus operandi the basis for the mandate is important to be familiar with. The 
main points will be highlighted in this paragraph.  
In the Machakos Protocol of 29 July 2002, the parties resolved the status of state and 
religion and the right of self determination for the people of South Sudan, they agreed on 
establishment of international monitoring mechanisms to supervise the agreement. In the 
Agreement on Security Arrangements during the Interim Period (six years) of 25th Sept 2003 
the parties agreed on an international monitored cease fire which would come into effect of the 
date a comprehensive agreement had been signed. This agreement included request for 
international monitoring and assistance of redeployment and demobilisation of military forces, 
the forming of new so-called Joint Integrated Units (JIU)119 and international support to 
implement DDR programmes. In the Agreement on Wealth Sharing during the Pre-interim and 
Interim Period of 7 January 2004, the parties agreed on wealth sharing mechanisms and the 
reconstruction of the war-affected areas, they also requested the international community to 
take a strong and constructive role in providing post conflict reconstruction assistance to 
Sudan.  The Protocol of Power Sharing of 26th May 2004 was the agreement on devolution of 
powers to the states (26 states in Sudan) and to the Government of Southern Sudan. Further 
they agreed on that general elections shall be conducted at all levels and completed by the end 
of the third year of the interim period (2009). International observers are requested to 
participate and support this process. The Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abei 
Area of 26th May 2004, the parties agreed on administration of the area and the international 
monitors should verify the implementation of these arrangements. As a response to the 
progress and agreements, the Security Council established an advanced political mission 
(UNAMIS) by resolution 1547 of 11 June 2004.  
UNAMIS was mandated to “facilitate contacts with the parties concerned and to 
prepare for a larger peace support operation following signing of a Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement”.120 The mission consisted of an SRSG, two Deputy SRSGs, a Chief Miladviser, a 
Police Adviser and 94 international staff, including military liaison and political and civil 
affairs staff, public information officers and experts in logistics and administration. This 
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mission was important in the process towards the final agreement and also to facilitate the 
deployment of a larger peacekeeping mission. Jan Pronk who had been leading the UN 
peacemaking efforts during the negotiations towards the peace agreement was appointed to be 
the SRSG. The SG appointed two Deputy SRSG`s, of which one was appointed the dual role 
of Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator (HC/RC).121 UNAMIS started their work in July 
2004, established HQ in Khartoum, the senior leaders established high level contact with the 
parties by participating in the peace process, the staff established local contacts, liaisons, 
conducted logistic preparations including establishing working relationships with the parties. 
Jan Pronk was involved in the Darfur processes and the mission also expanded to support 
AU`s establishment as well. Field offices were set up covering political, civil, military, police, 
humanitarian, logistic support and liaison functions. It also set up a small field office in 
Kassala to engage in civil and military liaison function with the local actors on the ground in 
the east of Sudan. UNAMIS continued their preparatory work until the SC decided to establish 
the peacekeeping force UNMIS in Resolution 1590 on 25th March 2005 as requested by the 
parties in the peace agreement. 
The Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation 
Modalities of 31 December 2004 framed the details of the military tasks to the UN. The 
mechanisms to be created and the timetable were agreed for implementation, monitoring and 
verification. The parties requested that the SRSG or his deputy participated in the Ceasefire 
Political Commission and the Force Commander in the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee. 
They requested participation of UN officers as chairs and monitors in Joint Military 
Committees, and that the UN should have operational control over Verification Monitoring 
team, Joint Military Commission (JMC) and Civilian Protection Monitoring Team. These 
requests were to become some of the main tasks to UNMIS and are vital as instruments to 
bring the parties together and to maintain the dialogue and communication. Further they 
requested assistance in mine action, and that the UN should provide establishment, capacity 
building and training of the police. The international partners were requested to have a 
supporting role to the national institutions conducting DDR. Funding and technical assistance 
was requested especially assistance for the funding of its army.  
The CPA was signed the 9th January 2005 and clearly stated that the parties requested the 
international partners and the international community in assisting Sudan to a lasting peace:  
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“The documents represented a concrete model for solving the wider problem of conflict within 
the country and that, if successfully implemented, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement would 
provide a model of good governance in the Sudan that would help to create a solid basis for 
the preservation of peace and would make unity appear attractive”.122 In order to succeed the 
UN and the international community and organisations must cooperate and coordinate their 
efforts across sectors. The mandate in SR 1590 is clearly based on consent and invitation from 
the parties, with the main intent to observe, monitor, verify and assist in implementation of the 
agreement. The mandate covers supporting and assistance tasks in all sectors, political, 
military, police, civil administration, human rights, humanitarian and reconstruction and 
capasity-buliding.123 The UN and the SG had already made a good foundation for success by 
establishing the advance mission and made sure that the senior managers in UNAMIS also 
became the leaders of the following UNMIS mission.  
Integrated planning for UNMIS 
In Chapter three it was stated that one of the most important pre-conditions for success with 
Integrated Mission is to get the UN Country Team and the civilian humanitarian/ development 
sector on board in the strategic planning as well as in the operational planning in the field. The 
most important is the actual contacts and relationships that must be established in the field in 
the theatre of operations. Further it stated that the strategic process should be done through 
establishment of what is called an Integrated Task Force. The planning for UNMIS had many 
advantages in achieving these aspects. Firstly the fact that the UN participated in the peace 
process implied that the planning and actions taken could be taken sequentially as the situation 
developed with the agreements. The long lead time meant that DPKO as well as other 
departments were in front of the situation, they had time to discuss, evaluate and come up with 
a unified solution. Thirdly the planning benefited from the smart composition of the senior 
management team and finally of course the already mentioned decision to deploy the advance 
mission (UNAMIS). Despite these advantages, UNMIS should struggle to build up the 
mission as authorised in Resolution 1590.  
The planning for the UNMIS mission was initiated as the peace talks and negotiations 
made progress and the parties came to agreements. The statement from the President of the 
Security Council on 10th October 2003 welcomed the progress and establishment of the 
Verification and Monitoring Team, the Joint Monitoring Commission and the Civilian 
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Protection Monitoring Team. He also assured the parties that the UN intended to support them 
in the implementation. He stated: “…requests the Secretary-General, in this connection, to 
initiate preparatory work, as soon as possible, in consultation with the parties, the IGAD 
(Intergovernmental Authority on Development) facilitators and the International Observers, on 
how the United Nations could best fully support the implementation of a comprehensive peace 
agreement.”124 Following this an Interdepartmental Task Force on Sudan was established 
headed by Mr. Tayé-Brook Zerihoun who came from the position as Director of the Africa 
Division in Department of Political Affairs (DPA). He was also to be appointed to be the 
principal Deputy SRSG in Sudan from 1 August 2004125 and thereby could ensure that the 
planning he had headed in the HQ also was coordinated and linked to the planning and 
preparations on the ground. The ITF was established to integrate the efforts of the wider UN 
system and to help develop a forward looking strategy for an effective UN role in support of 
the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement in the Sudan.  
When it comes to integration of actors in the theatre of operations the SG dispatched an 
assessment mission from 27 Nov to 16 December 2003 in order to consult with the parties at 
all levels, the Donor community, UN Country Team (UNCT), INGOs and existing monitoring 
missions. Further a special adviser with staff from DPA and DPKO deployed in March 2004 
to consult with senior officials from neighbouring countries, Sudan parties and IGAD 
members which was involved in the peace negotiations. In April 2004 a logistic expert team 
was deployed to assess the infrastructure, the possible areas for camps, HQs etc.126 The team 
worked closely with the UNCT to establish a future common logistic strategy. UNCT had 
been operating Operation Lifeline since 1989 and had good experience with the area and the 
logistical challenges in Sudan. Logistic proved to be one of the biggest challenges as a 
consequence of the size of the country, and the fact that most of the infrastructure in south was 
destroyed. Distance from Port Sudan to Khartoum is 662km, and takes about 1hour with fixed 
wing aircraft. From Khartoum to the regional capital Juba in South the distance is about 
1192km and takes 1, 5 hours with fixed wing aircraft.127 These practical challenges implied 
that UNMIS had to plan a decentralised Concept of Operations (CONOPS) with integrated 
civil-mil sector HQs, and also strengthen the sectors to be able to sustain their operations.  
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The next big step in the planning on the ground was the mentioned deployment of the 
UNAMIS mission. DPKO relied on the planning element of the UN Multinational Standby 
High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) for establishing the HQ of the advanced mission to 
Sudan. They were deployed from July 04 to February 05. SHIRBRIG was also to continue 
their contribution in UNMIS from April to December 2005. They provided the nucleus of the 
Force HQ, the Joint Military Coordination Office and the Integrated Support Services and also 
deployed a HQ security unit. The commander of SHIRBRIG served as Deputy Force 
Commander.128 The unit proved to be important in the planning and preparation for UNMIS, 
they could prepare and make the transition to UNMIS smoother.  They also crated breathing 
space to DPKO in the always time consuming force generation processes. However as 
mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the process of generate the forces and also the 
civilian staff proved to be challenging. Some facts are worth highlighting.  The authorized 
forces of 10 000 military and 715 police took over two years to reach. In June 2005 the 
military had 10 percent of its strength, while the police had 3, 6 percent. Four months later in 
November 2005 the military had reached 37, 3 percent and the police 31 percent. By March 
2006, one year after the initial deployments the military component had reached 78 percent 
and the police 66, 2 percent of its strength. By 31 March 2007 the military reached 96, 4 
percent (8766 troops, 999 observers) and the police had 92, 6 percent of mandated personnel 
(662), international civilian staff 900, local civilian employees 2 282 and 186 UN volunteers. 
The total personnel strength in UNMIS by 31 March 2007 was 13 395.129  
The reason for such delays is made of up several factors. According to a representative 
in DPKO, the main factor was that the UN had established large missions in Liberia, Côte 
d`lvoire, and still were strengthening the mission in DR Congo. All these missions are large 
multi dimensional missions, logistical demanding and creating heavy burdens on troop 
contributing nations.130 The logistical challenge in Sudan has been the second major factor to 
the delays in deployments. Long lines of communication and limited aviation assets hamper 
the tempo in deployment. Critical assets were lacking and it was simply not possible to 
transport the troops out in their sectors. Security within the area of operations was also an 
issue. In January February 2006 all UN convoys needed armed escort south of Juba due to the 
activity from Lords Resistance Army. This implied that the then limited amount of UN 
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infantry units became overstretched, and that the logistic convoys had to be postponed.131  
With the surge in UN peacekeeping that has been ongoing since 2003 the challenge to 
generate forces has become a main problem to DPKO. The planned strengthening of UNMIS 
(strengthen the military up to 17300 and police up to 3300 and also 16 formed police units) to 
be able to support AMIS in Darfur has proven to be difficult and may indicate that most 
nations is reaching their limits.132 
 The design of the SMT and the selection of the persons for these positions was 
probably one of the most important factors contributing to the focus on integration and 
involvement of the UNCT. History has told us that personalities matters, and also the Brahimi 
Report pointed on the need for quality in personnel chosen for senior positions. In UNMIS the 
quality and experience and the composition seem to be well thought-through. It seems that the 
SG favored continuity and experience. All had many years within the UN system, nearly all 
has experience from Sudan or Africa, and most important they were deployed with the 
advance mission in August 2004 and had plenty of time to establish good relations to the 
parties, actors and between themselves. The SRSG Jan Pronk and his Principal Deputy has 
already been mentioned. SRSG was directly involved in talks and negotiations with the 
parties, both in the CPA and also in Darfur, and his Principal Deputy came from the 
Interdepartmental Task Force on Sudan involved in the strategic planning. The other important 
position in the integrated concept is the HC/RC which requires good knowledge to the 
humanitarian and development sector and good relations to the organizations and actors. 
Manuel Da Silva was appointed the position as DSRSG/ HC/ RC in August 2004. He is 
responsible for the humanitarian aspects of the UN mission in Sudan including DDR of ex-
combatants, Returns and Resettlement of Displaced Persons, Protection issues, Mine Action 
and general Humanitarian Coordination (see figure 5 on the organisation below). As HC/RC 
he is also leading the UNCT on humanitarian coordination and development issues. His 
qualifications should vouch for success. He has worked for the UN WFP Food programme in 
Sudan; he was the first HC in Angola and eventually taking their role as UN RC and Resident 
Representative of UNDP. He was the Director of the Division on Complex Disasters in UN 
headquarters in New York, Department of Humanitarian Affairs. He has also served as the HC 
for the Horn of Africa, coordinating the humanitarian response to the drought of 2000. The 
SRSG worked closely with UNCT to ensure a unified strategy, which also is reflected in the 
Unified Mission Plan. However the UNCT is involved in a huge humanitarian operation and 
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the ambition to coordinate is overwhelming. As shown in the model of the humanitarian 
structure in Sudan, the practical coordination outside the mission is managed by OCHA. Note 
that this structure also is mirrored at sector level.  
 
 
Figure 5: Humanitarian Coordination Structure in Sudan133 
 
 
The Sudan Unified Mission Plan  
The theory on Integrated Mission presented in chapter three (page 28) states that the strategic 
as well as the operational processes takes all relevant actors into account. The discussion 
above shows that the planning for UNMIS was focused on achieving this ambition already 
from the outset in 2003. The Secretary General stressed that this mission had to be planned 
and executed in a comprehensive and integrated way in order to succeed. He secured 
continuance by appointing senior leaders already familiar with the area and who also was 
directly involved in the peace processes. The head of the Interdepartmental task force became 
the DSRSG, and the other DSRSG HC/RC was a seasoned leader familiar with both the 
humanitarian as well as the development sectors. SRSG was aware the importance of 
integrating the UNCT at all levels. The logistic and support planning team worked closely 
with the UNCT regarding the concept for logistics. The advanced mission (UNAMIS) with 
professional planners from SHIRBRIG secured that the HQ and the framework for UNMIS 
CONOPS was prepared. The planning resulted in the “Sudan Unified Mission Plan” which is 
the core document for the implementation of the mission. This document covers the basis for 
the mission, the mission structure, the programmes covering: Political affairs, Military, Police, 
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Civil Affairs, Electoral Assistance, Governance and Rule of Law, Human Rights and 
Protection of civilians, Gender and Public Information. All sectors are given definite tasks. 
Further the Humanitarian Assistance and Recovery and Development sector is also included 
with the following programmes: humanitarian assistance, return and reintegration, mine 
action, DDR and Sustainable development. 
The plan has a seven years perspective which is quite unique in such operations. The 
mission has taken four phases, harmonized with those in the CPA; pre interim period 
(6months), period up to national elections (3 ½ years), period up to referendum (2 ½ years) 
and period following the referendum, pre exit. The objective is stated to be achieved by 
addressing more than just monitoring the peace. “It will assist in the further building of peace. 
The strategy of the Mission will respond to the root causes of the decades of conflict”.134 The 
unified approach is stressed to make sure that the activities and initiatives are coherent and 
mutually reinforcing. Further it is stated that: “the Mission will to a large extent, build upon 
existing resources expertise and experiences and comparative advantages of the UN Country 
Team”.135 UNMIS has developed six principles for their operation that is worth reviewing: 1) 
One shared objective, 2) Common assumptions and parameters, 3) Responsibility to Consult, 
4) Responsibility to collaborate, 5) Responsibility to maximize shared resources and 6) 
Common decision making.  
The principle of responsibility to consult is interesting. As we learned from previous 
chapter, unity of effort and integration does not come by themselves. “All actors within the 
context of the unified Mission shall be subject to a duty to consult other stakeholders prior to 
making decision or undertaking action which may impact on other agencies or components 
work or affect the success of the mission as a whole”.136 SRSG is in other words stressing that 
the success of integration in fact relies on the ability to tear down classic walls between 
components, to have an inclusive attitude, to look up colleagues, discuss and then decide what 
to do. Those familiar with the military way of doing this, clearly will identify that this may be 
a challenge. The same goes for those familiar with some humanitarian actor’s reluctance 
toward discussing with the military. From the military point of view it is probably the sharing 
of information and intelligence together with operational planning that is most challenging. 
Information tends to be classified when it enters the military information system and the 
military planning for operations involves the civilians only in the final stage of the planning. 
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Operational Security is highlighted within the military and they see the civilian to be to 
reluctant and relaxed and leaking information to early. However in an integrated context such 
obstacles have to bee dealt with, and with the military in a supporting role as they are in 
UNMIS, it is even more important. The principles stated by the SRSG in the Unified Mission 
Plan can in fact be recommended as general principles for a coming doctrine on Integrated 
Missions. All are relevant in getting the actors together toward a common agreed goal.  
The final interesting aspect with this plan is that the UN Country Teams Work Plan for 
Sudan is to “bee seen as a part of the mission plan.”137 The Work Plan for Sudan covers the 
humanitarian and development sectors strategic plan for the coming year. The different 
humanitarian and recovery and reconstruction projects, which actor is doing what, where, 
priorities, aims, objectives and funding is covered in this plan. “It outlines what the United 
Nations believes are the most urgent needs that can and must be addressed by the United 
Nations system and its partners within a one-year timeframe.”138 The Work Plan of 2007 also 
includes UNMIS projects which indicate that the integration within this field actually is 
working. The Unified Mission Plan together with the Work Plan for Sudan shows that the 
integration between the peacekeepers and the UNCT has been functioning. The SRSGs focus 
on involvement of the UNCT seem to have been a success when it comes to the planning, the 
next is to look into how the structure and coordination mechanisms is organised in the field.  
UNMIS Integrated Structure 
The UN Mission in Sudan is as stated in the mission plan “a multidimensional operation with 
a unified character…and the success of the work in Sudan depend on a common subscription 
of all components to the system-political, humanitarian, human rights, development, 
economics and military.”139 To succeed with the above discussed planning and the interaction 
between the different components an integrated structure is also needed. As described in 
chapter three the integrated structure with integrated services is argued to be a pre-condition 
for success when it comes to an integrated approach. Further the senior management team was 
described as the most important function to succeed bringing the leaders together in a decision 
forum serving the whole Mission. This paragraph will explore and discuss how this is 
organised and functioning in UNMIS. Not all functional areas or components will be covered 
but focus on the most important, and those affecting the military component.  
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The model below (figure 6) gives a broad overview over the organisation of UNMIS and will 
be the basis for the discussion. The blue boxes represent the UNMIS Integrated HQ structure 
while the green organisation chart shows the military component which is deployed in six 
sectors throughout South Sudan. Note that all sector commands also have a civilian field office 
mirroring the structure at the HQ level. The UNMIS HQ is as mentioned located in Khartoum 
with all components co-localised enabling coordination and cooperation between them. The 
HQ was established in Khartoum in order to be in day-to-day dialogue with the Sudanese 
Government. UN Country Team is located with one office in Khartoum and one in Juba, 
enabling unified planning and coordination in the humanitarian and development sector. (An 
overview of the UNMIS and OCHA deployment can be seen in appendix D and E).  
 
 
 
Figure 6: UNMIS Mission structure 
  
The civilian/ military integrated functions and the civilian sections are headed by respective 
Deputy SRSGs, Chief of Staff, and Director of Administration (DOA). The military is also 
providing staff to the following integrated services in the mission HQ: Unified Mission 
Analysis Cell (UMAC), Integrated Support Services and Integrated training Cell. UNMIS has 
not been able to establish an integrated Joint Operations Centre, but rely on the JOC within the 
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military HQ.140 UNMIS is using the term “Unified” instead of “Integrated”, a decision by the 
SRSG, but essentially the aim is the same, to get every UN agency and partner towards a 
common agreed objective. The integrated services were established by UNAMIS staff before 
UNMIS came in to effect. The UMAC is collecting; coordinating and analysing information 
from civilian and military sources. They analyse risk and develop risk management advice. 
Further they produce reports and policy documents to improve the ability of the Mission to 
adapt and manage crises. Finally they prepare all Mission wide reporting to UNHQ in New 
York. The UMAC cell is struggling to reach the ambitions set in the DPKO policy document 
to become a true analytic and intelligence provider to the SMT. Like other UN missions 
(Liberia, Congo) lack of qualified personnel and comprehensive data systems is a problem. 
The UMAC will require that it is staffed with intelligence officers and civilian analytical staff 
with the qualifications and experience needed. High turnover of personnel is also a challenge 
which means that the cell continuously must conduct on-the-job training with new personnel. 
UNMIS has started to recruit local employees to some positions in this cell, and that might 
solve some of these problems, especially when it comes to analyse information in local 
language and to uphold continuity. 141  
The JOC is not integrated in UNMIS but located within the military HQ. There has not 
been provided resources to establish an integrated JOC neither personnel nor equipment. 
Despite this fact it seems to work well at least for the Force Commander and the military 
component.142 According to former chief of staff the main challenge is that the staff is 
bringing “bad habits” from earlier missions and that it will take time to implement new 
structures and concepts. “To gear the HQ in a common battle rhythm is the main challenge” in 
that aspect. 143 The DPKO ambition that all missions shall establish a Joint Integrated 
Operations Centre (JOC) and a Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) will take time to 
implement. Main problem is lack of qualified personnel and lack of funding for the needed 
equipment. Today the JMAC/UMAC system is more an info management cell than a true 
analysis cell providing decision support to the senior managers.  
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The policy document on JOC-JMAC and the ambitious goals set in the Under Secretary 
General DPKOs document “Peace Operations 2010” 144 seem to indicate that the integration 
process at this level will be further focused and prioritised in the future and thereby it is 
possible to see that a fully integrated new HQ structure is emerging.  One question should be 
whether this is needed or worth the costs? One comment from a former chief of staff in 
UNMIS was that as long as the HQs are co-localised as in UNMIS there is no need to establish 
another civil-military HQ above all other. Communication and coordination across 
components should be possible without establishing a new in practice HQ. They will demand 
more personnel and staffing, and that will logically thin out the footprint on the ground. A 
consequence for the military is to provide more officers to new headquarter structures, or 
integrate civilian into their own JOCs. However as stated in DPKO policy on JOC and JMAC 
the new structure shall not replace the current and that will in practice mean a new structure at 
the Mission HQ level.145   
When it comes to integrated logistics, the UNMIS mission Integrated Support Services 
plans, coordinate and delivers logistical services mission wide. They are coordinating the 
functioning of mission logistics resources, personnel and equipment as determined by the 
priorities given by the senior management of the mission. Military logistics and support units 
including Force Medical unit, Force Military Aviation Unit, Force Transport Company and 
Force Engineer Construction Company are all integrated military components of the logistic 
system. Due to the size of the country and the bad road conditions, aviation is the main 
operational mobility within the theatre. Aircraft and helicopters are a critical asset to UNMIS 
as well as other organisations in the area and require close cooperation with the civilian sector. 
There is also a growing need to regional cooperation between missions when it comes to 
strategic and operational air assets. As exemplified with the aviation section in MONUC 
which serve the mission in Burundi, UNMIS and also Eritrea in addition to its own in DR 
Congo. Regional cooperation between missions has become a desired need in UN operations 
in Africa as the needs are bigger than the available resources. When it comes to cooperation 
with the humanitarian sector it is the UN Joint Logistic Centre (UNJLOC) based in UNMIS 
HQ which is tracking logistic recourses, contractors and provide information and coordination 
to the humanitarian agencies through their web based information platform.146 
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The senior management team (SMT) has been accounted for earlier, but a quick review is 
useful. The SMT in UNMIS consists of the SRSG, Force Commander, Principal DSRSG, 
Police Commissioner, DSRSG/HC/RC and Director of Administration (DOA). According to 
Force Commander this team meets everyday in a morning meeting where Force commander 
orients the mission about the military situation. Since all are co-localised it is easy to meet, de-
conflict and sort things out when needed. The SMT seems to function according to the 
intention in the integrated concept. One main point to highlight from the Force Commander is 
that the main thing to remember in an integrated concept is to understand roles and functions 
and use the mechanisms to coordinate. “Everybody must understand their respective role, 
integration does not mean interference…there is a tendency that the civilians are treating the 
military as a warehouse, ordering services and expecting delivery by the hours.”147 This is of 
course a result of the fact that it is still the military which has the resources and is easy to 
contact in their camps or when they are out on patrols. The SMT is not able to solve all tension 
and problems, much of the decisions are decentralized to sector commanders. UNMIS has 
faced big challenges with the need to have a scattered CONOPS combined with the distances 
and logistical challenges. Sector command is thereby the most important level to sort out the 
short term needs and problems.148 The distances from Force HQ to the sector HQs implies that 
all transport between must mainly be done by aircraft. From Khartoum to sector 1 in Juba 
there is about 1300km by air, to sector 2 in Wau 1150km, sector 3 Malakal 700km, sector 4 
Kadugli 600km, and to sector 5 in Ed Damarzin it is about 450km (See map Sudan in 
appendix B). Further mission decentralization is on the agenda and UNMIS has started a 
phased programme to strengthen especially sector 1 in Juba enabling them to deliver increased 
and more efficient support. Logistical, administrative and operational challenges and the fact 
that there is a need to have closer interaction with the government in southern Sudan are the 
main reasons for this. 
UNMIS military component role and function 
The Military Component is the core of UNMIS. Authorized strength in resolution 1590 was 
9250 troops and 750 military observers. By 31 March 2007 the mission had reached to 8766 
troops and 599 military observers (With the Darfur expansion in SR 1706 the authorized 
strength is raised to 27 300 military). Today there is 60 different nationalities within the 
military component (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Kenya, China is the dominating 
nations in number of troops).The Military Force HQ is located in Khartoum together with the 
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Mission HQ. The military HQ is organised as a standard military HQ with G-staff functions 
(G1 personnel, G2 Information, G3 operations, G4 Logistics, G5 CIMIC, and G6 
communications and signals) The Force Commander provides operational control (OPCON)149 
to the military component, including all formed units, observers, liaisons and those staff 
officers in integrated services. 
The Concept of Operations (CONOPS) is decentralization due to the fact of the 
realities on the ground, the tasks agreed with the parties, the need to liaise on day to day basis, 
the need for coordination with civil sector etc. The area of operations has been divided into six 
sectors, each headed by a civilian sector director supported by a sector military commander in 
charge of all military personnel within the sector. Each sector consists of a UN task force with 
an infantry battalion as the core force and protection element (Coys in sector 4 and 6). Further 
each sector has Combat Service and Support Units (CSS) which consists of transport coy, 
engineer coy, de-mining coy, helicopter unit (civil or mil), role 2 medical coy (role 3 in sector 
4). There are observer groups in each sector operating from two to four team sites. One 
decentralised battalion size reserve headquartered in sector 4, one coy garrisoned in sector 1, 2 
and 3. In addition to this there is a Joint Monitoring and Coordination Office in Juba to 
support the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee, and finally a Redeployment Coordination HQ, 
located in Eastern Sudan responsible for monitoring the redeployment of troops in that area. 
The detailed deployment in sectors and sites can bee seen in appendix D.  
The purpose of the military components mission is to monitor and verify the Ceasefire 
Agreement and to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The 
key tasks given to the military component is as follows:150 
a) Support the acceptance of the overall peace agreement. 
b) Establish liaison with the Parties, agencies and other actors. 
c) Monitor and verify lines of disengagement 
d) Monitor and verify assembly areas and redeployment of forces 
e) Monitor and verify formation of the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs). 
f) Provide force protection within the AOR. 
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g) Protect UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and ensuring the security and freedom of 
movement of UN personnel. 
h) Protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence within capabilities. 
i) Open land, air and waterways lines of communication. 
j) Assist within capabilities the DDR process. 
k) Support within capabilities UN programme in the region. 
l) Advise and assist the African Union Mission (AMIS) in the Darfur region. 
 
The military roles in UNMIS can be described in three broad areas. 1) Observation, 
monitoring and verification role. 2) Protection Role. 3) Supporting and assisting role. The first 
role and the primary task are to monitor and observe that the parties implement the agreement 
they have signed. That they withdraw their forces, that they start to demobilise and that the 
new so-called Joint Integrated Units are formed. This is the core motive for the UNMIS 
operation and what can be described as a “main effort” for the military component. To succeed 
in upholding the dialogue and keep the pressure on the parties to redeploy their forces and 
demobilise as agreed will be the key to stabilize and establish a lasting peace and be able to 
progress with the next steps. The tools UNMIS has chosen for this task is the Ceasefire Joint 
Military Commission structure. At the ground they have established Joint Monitoring Teams 
with the observers in each sector. They conduct the day-to-day monitoring and verification by 
upholding contact with the parties, verify that units actually are redeployed out of their 
positions etc. These teams report to the sector level Area Joint Military Committee (AJMC) 
which in turn reports to the Cease Fire Joint Military Commission (CFJMC) headed by the 
Force Commander. This is the main point for dialogue where the parties inform about their 
status and agrees on adjustments in timings and so on. The result from this commission goes to 
the final political level the Ceasefire Political Committee. The nature of these tasks requires 
close cooperation with the parties to build trust and uphold the consent from the parties to 
UNMIS. The mandate of UNMIS is in nature consent based and the mission and tasks can not 
be solved without the parties support and that themselves take responsibility for their own 
progress. UNMIS can uphold pressure, but not force the implementation on the parties.  
The Protection role is the main role of the formed units (Infantry) which in sum 
consists of about 4000 troops. The protection forces are responsible for protecting UN 
personnel, staff, installations and equipment as well as protect civilians who come under 
imminent treat or danger and to secure freedom of movement for UN units and personnel. This 
part of the mission is mandated in chapter VII which imply that the forces can use force to 
solve these tasks. Typically the forces guards installations and camps, patrols the area of 
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responsibility and conduct escorts of convoys. UNMIS military forces are not responsible for 
the local security and the law and order within the areas but assist if required and requested. 
These tasks imply cooperation with the civilian authorities, the UN civilian staff and agencies 
as well other civilian organisations if for instance escorts are provided. The supporting and 
assist role implies to support the UN development programme, humanitarian efforts, the 
parties DDR process and also to assist the AMIS peacekeeping force in Darfur. These tasks 
require close cooperation, communication and liaison with the different elements that shall be 
supported.  
In the context of integration the nature of UNMIS task portfolio requires close liaison 
and cooperation with the parties and their armed forces as well as close cooperation with the 
civilian and humanitarian sector. The sector levels also have a civilian structure covering most 
of the functions as the headquarters has (political, police, human rights etc). As mentioned 
above the CONOPS is decentralized and the sector command must solve most of the problems 
at this level. Another important point is that the humanitarian and development structure at the 
HQ level also is mirrored at sector level. OCHA has an office in all sectors (see map in 
appendix D) enabling cooperation. The dialogue towards OCHA is normally done by UNMIS 
Civil-Military Liaison Officers. The CIMIC structure is worth to mention as it in fact is not so 
well developed in UNMIS or in other UN missions. CIMIC in UNMIS consists of totally 10 
officers (0,001 percent of the total strength). Three in UNMIS HQ and one in each sector 
command. The CIMIC officers are refereed to as Civil-Military Liaison Officers (CMLO) and 
the primary function is to liaise towards the local OCHA office and the other agencies present 
in the sectors.151  
CIMIC below sector level is a national responsibility and as Cedric de Coning argues 
very few of the dominating nations providing troops to the UN has developed CIMIC 
structures and functions within their forces. “CIMIC is more or less a Western phenomenon 
and very few nations outside Europe, USA, and Australia have CIMIC doctrines and 
structures”.152 However, the units are conducting Civil-Military Operations like “community 
support” or so called “quick impact projects”. Community support is tasks conducted to 
support the local community and to build confidence in the peace process (road repair, 
bridges, support to social services, clinics etc). Quick Impact Projects are projects intended to 
support an urgent need on short notice at local level. They are funded in the Mission budget 
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normally coordinated by the civil affairs. The CIMIC function focusing on liaison harmonizes 
with the DPKO Civil-Military Coordination Policy document. However reading the definition 
in this document almost everything UNMIS do relates to CIMIC. “UN Civil-Military 
Coordination is the system of interaction, involving exchange of information, negotiation, de-
confliction, mutual support and planning at all levels between humanitarian organizations, 
development organizations or the civilian population, to achieve respective objectives.”153 The 
point is that CIMIC covers a wide area and since the Mission it selves more or less is based on 
CIMIC the responsibility firstly is the commanders at all levels secondly those who actually 
does the coordination on the ground. However in accordance with the policy document agreed 
with the humanitarian and development sector the focal point for requests from the civilian 
goes through the local OCHA office witch takes the issue up to HC/RC level if needed or the 
local CIMIC liaison on smaller day-to-day issues.  
The lessons from the UNMIS operation the first two years are that everything is going 
slower than the timelines and phases originally planned for. The main focus of the military 
component has been the struggle to build forces and deploy and establish in respective sectors. 
Problems with force generation, delay in troop contributing countries, problems with logistics, 
limited aviation resources and security problems in the area of Juba has hampered the planned 
deployment. By September 2005 only the Force HQ, sector 1 in Juba and the observer teams 
could be declared operational. By December the military component had managed to deploy 
about 40 percent of its forces.154 The consequence was that the parties were relaxed in starting 
the processes agreed in CPA, no Joint Integrated Units were formed and UNMIS struggled to 
be able to verify numbers the parties claimed to have withdrawn. By March 2006 the situation 
had improved and the military strength had raise to 78 percent of the planned structure.155 
Problems with Lords Resistance Army activity south of Juba hampered the deployment and 
every UN columns needed escort which in turn led to overstretched protection units and 
further delay for the logistic deployment. By June 2006 the force was almost complete and 
finally operational in the area of operations.156 The rainy season increased the mobility 
problems due to lack of helicopters. The main problem has been force generation and troop 
contributing countries delay in deploying critical assets. The Pakistani aviation unit, force de-
mining companies and the Chinese contingent was over a year delayed. In an operational 
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environment like Sudan, lack of helicopters, engineers and medical units will hamper the 
whole operation and ultimately give a negative picture towards the UN from the parties and 
local population which do not see any progress as expected in the CPA. However the latest 
status report from the SG indicates progress in the parties’ redeployment and formation of the 
new Joint Integrated Units and that UNMIS military component has intensified its verification 
and monitoring. On the contrary the security situation continues to bee tense, one UN soldier 
had been killed in January 2007 and there have been several attacks on humanitarian 
organisations in the South. Other armed groups and the Lords Resistance Army elements 
activity imply that the military increasingly must focus on security tasks.157  
When it comes to the cooperation with the humanitarian sector the lessons is that the 
level of cooperation varies much as a result of the problems mentioned above. However the 
steadily increased UN presence in the areas resulted in more humanitarian activity by civil 
organisations. “Nearly 1,8mill people including about 120 000 returnees every month, have 
been assisted with general food distributions. More than 600 new water sources have been 
constructed”.158 During the first quarter of 2006 UNMIS military component supported 
humanitarian efforts in providing medical and engineering services and by deploying UN 
military observers to reduce tensions. The UNMIS engineer and medical units has been 
occupied with supporting the local communities in road repair and also equipping and 
supporting medical clinics.159 One of the main problems within the humanitarian sector is that 
they only manage to raise 50 percent of the funds requested for in the Work Plan for 2005, and 
consequently the military has to support reconstruction projects within their sectors. However 
UNMIS seem to prioritize local capacity building and include the local population in much of 
the reconstruction efforts. The latest quarterly report from the SG states: “UNMIS engineer 
units have assisted in road repair and construction, but wherever possible, local labor is trained 
to carry out such tasks”.160 As the situation in Darfur developed throughout 2006 into 2007 the 
humanitarian problems has been rising. “Over 2 million people are now internally displaced, 
and their numbers continue to rise, while 1, 9 million conflict affected residents remain largely 
dependent on external aid”. 161 Darfur will influence UNMIS and the military component is 
likely to be even busier with protection and security tasks supporting the humanitarian 
organizations during 2007.  
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 United Nations, S/2007/213 
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Summing up this chapter 
This chapter has reviewed and discussed how UNMIS has approached their task in an 
integrated manner. The whole mission seems to be marked by an integrated strategy from the 
outset and that the planning in many ways succeeded in integrating the UN Country Team and 
the humanitarian sector. The SG focused and stated that in order to succeed with the UN effort 
in Sudan had to bee planned and executed in an integrated unified manner. SRSG followed 
this appeal and stressed this in his own planning at country level. The SG designed a unified 
Senior Management Team for the advance mission (UNAMIS) which had the task to prepare 
and make the transition to a larger peacekeeping force smoother. UNCT was involved early in 
the planning; they had the area knowledge, the experience with humanitarian operations since 
early 1960s and were currently running “Operations Lifeline”. The preparation for UNMIS 
had many advantages as it could be prepared sequentially as the parties came to agreements 
throughout 2003-2004. The SRSG and his senior managers were to continue in their positions 
in UNMIS, the SRSG as well as the Force Commander was involved in the peace process 
which led to the signing of the CPA in January 2005. UNAMIS with the staff from 
SHIRBRIG managed to deploy rapidly and was partly operational in July 2004 and could start 
the work and planning for UNMIS. Logistic planning, development of a CONOPS and 
establishment of liaison and contact with the parties was prioritized.  
 The planning in 2004 resulted in a Unified Plan for Sudan coordinated with the UNCT 
Sudan Work Plan. HQ was established in Khartoum with all components co-localized. Six 
sector commands with civil field offices and three to four team sites in each sector. UNCT had 
one office in Khartoum and one in Juba, OCHA established offices in all UNMIS sectors all 
enabling coordination and cooperation. UNMIS biggest challenge has been the deployment 
and establishment in sectors and sites. The Mission lacked critical assets and was not fully 
operational before June 2006. The military mission is to observe, monitor and verify that the 
parties comply with their CPA and keep the deadlines they have agreed on. Secondary task is 
to support the humanitarian effort the recovery and reconstruction efforts and the DDR 
program.  First year has been focused on deployment and construction of their own camps, 
sites and facilities and road repair in order to improve the mobility. The mission itself requires 
close coordination and cooperation with the parties as well as within the UN Mission and the 
humanitarian sector outside.  
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5 The Implications of the Integrated Missions to the military component 
This thesis started with a presentation of the dominating trend towards increased civil-military 
integration in today’s peace operations. Nations and the international organisations are 
realizing that a longer term effort and a more comprehensive strategy is needed in order to 
succeed bringing the conflict areas from war to lasting peace. The UN has been developing an 
integrated civil-military structure in their multi-dimensional peacekeeping mission since 1989. 
The peacekeeping operations of the 1990s brought hard lessons and also innovations witch the 
UN operations are marked by today. The self examination of the UN after the failures in 
Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda led to a call for reform of the UN system and approach to 
peacekeeping. The Brahimi report recommended better coordination and common strategy to 
UN peace operations. The Concept of Integrated Mission is established and implemented in 
most of UN`s multi dimensional operations. DPKO has implemented an integrated planning 
process and has also ambitions to further change the structure of the missions, establishing 
Joint Mission Analysis Centres and Joint Operational Centres and Integrated Training Service 
in addition to the already Integrated Support Services. The operation in Sudan was planned 
and established as a unified mission and clearly is operating as an integrated manner. The 
question of how this concept is going to affect and influence the military component will be 
answered by synthesising the findings from the previous three chapters. 
Historical lessons 
First of all the historical lessons from the development towards integration “forced” all 
organisations involved in peace operations to recognise that the environment had changed and 
that everybody had to change their thinking and approach towards such operations. We 
learned that the military alone could not solve the problems and that a short focused mentality 
of, “get the mission done, do the election and go home”, not would be cost effective. The UN 
was likely to return to the country again. The operations in Namibia, Cambodia, Somalia and 
Bosnia pioneered the way toward integration. The humanitarian agenda raised and the theatre 
of operations became increasingly crowded. The practical consequences for the military was a 
wider task portfolio involving increasingly more non-military tasks witch required more 
communication, coordination and cooperation with the civilian actor in the theatre. 
Commanders had to be able to talk to and cooperate with civilian personnel on operational 
matters, contradictory to Huntington’s ideal being separated from the civilians and focused on 
the military profession of orchestrating violence.  
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Structural changes occurred as the UN Mission increasingly became civilized in form and 
function. The Military Force Commander had to step down from being head of mission to 
become the military adviser to the SRSG. With the new tasks and focus the UN Mission staff 
became civilized as well. The logistics had to serve more than just the military forces. Civilian 
Police became part of the structure and generally more partners became involved in the 
peacekeeping effort. The military component established CIMIC as new functions within their 
staff to improve coordination with the humanitarian sector which increasingly took up more 
space in the area of operations.  
Integrated Planning 
The Integrated Mission Planning Process focuses on involving all relevant actors and the 
intent is to bring the long term development programmes and the shorter term peacekeeping 
operations together in a coherent strategy for the UN effort. The Military components advising 
role will increase and be important when planning for new operations. In a complex integrated 
context the military is not likely to have the main effort, at least not in the strategic plan. The 
UN Country Team may need the military support to be able to continue their operation and 
thereby improve the progress toward long lasting peace in an area. On the other hand the 
military will still be the dominating and core actor for a UN peacekeeping mission and all 
other components and agencies will depend on the military to provide a secure environment. 
The operational main effort must thereby be the military component witch establishes the 
framework for the civilian parts of the mission and operation.  
 Integrated planning implies that military planners constantly must be in dialogue and 
cooperate with the civilian parts of the mission and even more important, with the UN Country 
Team down to the tactical level in the field. Such interaction demand that the military 
traditional culture of “telling others what they intent to do” must change to more “what can we 
in common achieve and how can I support you” type of questions. In other words the dialogue 
must take place before decisions are taken so that everybody is on the same sheet of the map 
and are pulling towards the same agreed common objective and end state. The history has told 
us that this not will be easy and probably the consequences is more interaction in pre-mission 
training or even joint integrated courses at staff colleges and military participation in civilian 
courses as well. The SRSG UNMIS advice on everybody’s responsibility to consult will be 
useful to achieve a common understanding and to synchronise the actions taken to solve the 
problems.  “A unified approach of all UN agencies also implies the duty to consult each other 
about each other’s work, the duty to cooperate and to use a common infrastructure and 
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common services. Finally this unified approach requires the acceptance of a unified 
command.”162 
Integrated Structure 
With the Integrated Mission follows an integrated structure witch the UN has developed since 
the early missions in Namibia in 1989 and Cambodia in 1992. The Under Secretary General 
DPKO has set out structural changes in his “Peace Operations 2010” document and has 
instructed all UN peacekeeping missions to establish the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) and 
the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC). Two functions that in many ways will complete 
the development towards a true Joint Integrated Headquarters covering all of the traditional J1-
6 structures we find in military joint headquarters.  
The UN has as we learned from UNMIS not been able to reach the ambitions with the 
JOC and JMAC functions yet due to lack of personnel and equipment. However the 
consequences for the military will be that more staff officers must be provided to fill these 
new structures, and for the JMAC that requires intelligence analytical qualifications. For the 
JOC function qualifications and experience from military JOCs and crisis management 
experience will be needed. Another challenge with this is the clash of culture that probably 
will increase especially when we integrate the intelligence function into the JMAC. Sharing of 
information with external actors has not been common in a military system and some barriers 
have to bee moved and broken down. But again Integration is something more then sharing 
unclassified information about what different agencies and organisations are doing and what 
they know. It is about creating a unified effort, an agreed and common strategy, a common 
plan; it is about prioritising and as Pronk states accepting that you are part of a larger complex 
system. When it comes to the structure below the Mission headquarters it will also consist of a 
civil-military structure, but here there will be more coordination and liaison than integration. 
The civil field office will have most of the same function as in the HQ, but the implications to 
the military component will not change at this level.  
Integrated Command  
The Integrated Mission implies acceptance of a unified command. The SRSG is the highest 
authority in the theatre of operations and he manages the operation through his Senior 
Management Team. The SMT is a forum for discussion and decision and the core instrument 
for the commanders to agree on a comprehensive approach. History has told us that the 
                                                 
162
 Jan Pronk, “Fifteen guidelines for Peacekeepers” Weblogg no 41, 25 February 2007. Available at:  
http://www.janpronk.nl/index120.html 
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relationship between the SRSG and the Force Commander as well as the other senior leaders is 
of outmost importance to succeed in the mission. The SMT must be designed and build as a 
team before they arrive in the operations. The UNMIS example that all participated in the 
planning and was cooperating almost six months before they entered the Mission is probably a 
unique situation, but anyway the UNMIS example has shown that a strong and well prepared 
SMT will be important to succeed with the integrated concept.  
When it comes to military command the Force Commander will continue to execute 
Operational Control (OPCON) over all military personnel within the UN Mission, also those 
designated to integrated services. Sector Commanders will do the same within their sectors. 
The troop contributing countries (TCC) will continue to exercise full command over their 
forces and in theory be able to interfere in the chain of command. However as the history from 
the 1990s has shown, such issues should be clarified before the troops enter the area. As we 
learned from the UNMIS planning process, integration of the TCCs early in the Integrated 
Task Force will ensure that they not enter the area of operations not knowing what they really 
have said yes to, and that they are able to sort out caveats and restrictions before they arrive in 
the area. Not covered in this thesis but the Force Commander has to be aware of all such 
obstacles before he decide on the CONOPS. Currently this is an issue in UNMIS expansion 
toward Darfur and the support for AMIS. When it comes to military support to civilian led 
operations (UN agencies or INGOs) the forces remains in their normal command structure.  
Cimic functions in the military  
The hypothesis that the CIMIC functions within the military units will be more important in an 
Integrated Mission was not verified in this thesis. On the contrary it seems that the UN is 
focusing these special functions toward liaison. The UN is defining CIMIC as Civil-Military-
Coordination instead of Cooperation. The UN has coordinated their CIMIC policy with OCHA 
at the strategic level and it states that military support is seen as a last resort for the 
humanitarian sector. However as we have seen in Sudan the military and the humanitarian 
sector share logistical assets, the planning for the logistic strategy was done in close 
cooperation with the UN Country Team and so on. An Integrated Mission will in nature be 
inclusive when it comes to the peacekeepers and the peace-builders. The military must 
cooperate and coordinate at all levels and the whole Mission can in some ways be related to 
the classical understanding of CIMIC. The military component in UNMIS has a task that 
involves close liaison and dialogue and cooperation with both the parties of the conflict as well 
as the civilian actors playing in the operation.  
 73 
6 Conclusion 
This thesis has analysed the UN concept of Integrated Mission in order to find out how the 
implementation of concept may affect and influence the military arm. It has reviewed the 
historical lessons from the 1990s with the growth of the humanitarian agenda and the 
increasingly complex environment with civil and military players which ultimately led to need 
for better coordiantion and cooperation. The call for coherence within the UN and between the 
different agencies in 1997 enhanced in the Brahimi Report and again with the Report on 
Integrated Missions in 2005 has intensified the focus on the concept. Integration is now stated 
to be the guidning principle for UN peace operations and clearly a concept wich the UN and 
DPKO is implementing in their operations. The SG has implemented the model of SRSG as 
the highest authority and two Deputies of which one has the dual role as HC/RC and is 
heading the UN county team. DPKO has implemented the Integrated Mission Planning 
Process which they used in the planning for Sudan. DPKO has aslo started a process to change 
the HQ structures in the field, establishing more Joint Integrated Services (JOC and JMAC) 
which ulitmately will lead  to more civil-military staffs at that level.  
The concequenses for the military can be summarised as follows: 
1) The importance of accurate and clear military advises in the strategic as well as 
operational planning will increase. The military is only one part of a larger and wider 
context. 
2) The interaction with the civilian sector, humanitarian, development, political will 
increase and the military officers must learn how to approach this to create a 
constructive dialogue and not only focus on “briefing the others what they do”. 
3) There will be more integrated civil-military services at HQ level and the military must 
fill staff positions in the new Joint Operations Centres and Joint Mission Analysis 
Centres. This will demand experience from higher level military staffs, crises response 
experience and intelligence expertice in the JMAC.  
4) The CIMIC function within UN is focusing on coordination and liaison and the 
military support to the civilian actors will be better planned and coordinated at higher 
levels as part of the overall mission strategy. It may put more pressure on the miltiary 
logistics especially critical assets like transport, aviation and engineers.  
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Appendix A: Statistics UN peacekeeping 2007 
This is an overview of the recent Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping Missions with their 
Resolutions, number of tasks in mandates and the size of authorized force structure. The table 
shows the development from the up-start of the missions to present. The data is colleted from 
DPKO and SC Resolutions on each mission.  
Mission UN Resolution Tasks Force structure 
 
   Millitary  
(Troops and observers) 
Police Int 
Civil 
Local  
Civ 
Remarks 
UN Mission  
in DRCongo 
(MONUC) 
1999- 
1258, 1999, (Mil liaison) 
1279, 1999, (Observers) 
1291, 2000, (Chapter VII) 
1445, 2002 
1493, 2003 
1565, 2004 (Expansion) 
 
Strength as of 28 Feb-07 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
18 
90 
500 
5537 
8700 
10800 
16700 
 
17342 (54 nations) 
 
 
 
341 
841 
 
 
1028 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
940 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2051 
 
 
Authorized to 
use all 
necessary 
means.  
UN Mission in 
Liberia 
(UNMIL) 
2003- 
1509, 2003, (chapter VII) 
1694, 2005 
 
Strength as of 28 Feb 07 
 
19 15000 
14875 
 
14056 (52 nations) 
1115 
1240 
 
1201 
 
 
 
524 
 
 
 
931 
 
UN Mission in 
Côte d`lvoire 
(UNOCI) 
2004- 
1528, 2004 (chapter VII) 
1609, 2005 
1682, 2006 
 
Strength as of 28 Feb 07 
28 6240  
7090 
 
 
8053 (45 nations) 
 
350 
725 
 
 
1,138  
435 
 
 
 
371 
 
 
 
 
524 
 
 
 
 
UN Stabilisation 
Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH) 
2004- 
1542, 2004 (chapter VII) 
1702, 2006 
 
Strength as of 29 Feb 07 
14 6700 
7200 
 
6799 (19 nations) 
1622 
1951 
 
1802 
 
 
 
431 
 
 
 
718 
 
UN Mission in 
Sudan  
(UNMIS) 
2005- 
1590, 2005 (Chapter VI) 
1706, 2006 (expansion) 
 
Strength as of 28 Feb 07 
 
13 10000 
27300 (authorised) 
 
9978 (61 nations) 
715 
4015 
 
642 
 
 
 
851 
 
 
 
2250 
Ch VII in parts 
UN Mission in 
Burundi 
(ONUB) 
2004-06 
 
UN integrated 
office in Burundi 
(BINUB) 
2007- 
 
1545, 2004 (Chapter VII) 
 
 
 
 
 
16 5565 (47 nations) 
 
 
 
 
0 
97 
 
 
 
 
11 
316 
 
 
 
 
242 
383 
 
 
 
 
308 
Mission 
terminated and 
replaced  with a 
peace building 
mission in 2007 
 
 
UNMIS: 68 nationalities within the military force, 45 nationalities within the police force. 13 tasks in SR 1590. Tasks related 
to monitoring and observation, security, DDR program, restructure of local police, facilitate and coordinate return of refugees, 
support humanitarian assistance, contribute to protect human rights. Acting under Chapter VII: “UNMIS is authorized to take 
the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to protect UN personnel, 
facilities, installations, and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, 
humanitarian workers, joint assessment mechanism and assessment and evaluation commission personnel, and, without 
prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Sudan, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical 
violence”.163 In resolution 1706 the ambition is even higher: “Decided that UNMIS is authorized to use all necessary means, 
in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities:”…to protect United Nations personnel, 
facilities, installations and equipment, to ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, 
humanitarian workers, assessment and evaluation commission personnel, to prevent disruption of the implementation of the 
Darfur Peace Agreement by armed groups, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Sudan, to protect 
civilians under threat of physical violence. In order to support early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace 
Agreement, to prevent attacks and threats against civilians, to seize or collect, as appropriate, arms or related material whose 
presence in Darfur is in violation of the Agreements and the measures imposed by paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 1556, and 
to dispose of such arms and related material as appropriate;.” 
 
                                                 
163
 S/ RES/1590: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/284/08/PDF/N0528408.pdf?OpenElement 
 76 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 77 
Appendix B: The Planning Process for a UN Peacekeeping Mission164 
This is a model of the planning process from initiation of a UN operation to deployment. The 
Integrated Task Force is shown on the left side.  
 
 
                                                 
164
 Challenges of Peace Operations Project, “Capstone Doctrine”, 2006,  p. 19.  
 78 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 79 
Appendix C: Map over Sudan165 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
165United Nations Cartographic Section:  http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/sudan.pdf 
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Appendix D: UNMIS Area of Operations and Deployment April 2007166 
This map shows how UNMIS is deployed in six sectors throughout South Sudan. All sectors have combined 
capacity in order to be self sustained in their area of operation. In addition there is a UNMIS liaison cell 
established in AMIS HQ in Darfur. 
 
 
 
                                                 
166
 United Nations Cartographic Section:  http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/unmis.pdf 
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Appendix E: Integrated Presence in Sudan January 2007167 
This map shows how UNMIS, OCHA and Resident Coordinator Offices are deployed throughout Sudan.  
 
 
                                                 
167http://www.unsudanig.org/library/mapcatalogue/sudan/data/orgnaization_presences/Map%20717%20Projected
%20UNMIS-RCO-OCHA%20Presence%20in%20Sudan%202007.pdf 
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Appendix F: The UN agencies deployment December 2006168 
 
 
                                                 
168http://www.unsudanig.org/library/mapcatalogue/sudan/data/orgnaization_presences/Map%20786%20Agencies
%20Presence%20in%20Sudan.jpg 
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